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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 26, 2014, the Chicago district (Region 13) of the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) ruled that Northwestern University’s
scholarship football players were employees of the institution under the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and could unionize and bargain
collectively. 1 Traditionally, college sports have operated under the
National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (NCAA) fundamental
principle of “amateurism,” 2 only allowing student-athletes to receive
grants-in-aid (i.e., athletic scholarships) to help pay for their college
educations while concurrently engaging in competitive athletics for their
universities. 3 This principle of “amateurism” ensures that generally,
student-athletes who are, or have been, paid to play are essentially
permanently ineligible to compete in varsity athletic competition in that
particular sport. 4
The Chicago district’s milestone 2014 ruling threatened the
fundamental paradigm of amateurism in collegiate sports by permitting

1. See also Kathryn Kisska-Schulze & Adam Epstein, “Show Me the Money!”—Analyzing
the Potential State Tax Implications of Paying Student-Athletes, 14 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 13, 1314 (2014); Brian Bennett, Northwestern Players Get Union Vote, ESPN COLLEGE FOOTBALL (Mar.
27, 2014, 9:23 AM), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/10677763/northwestern-wildcatsfootball-players-win-bid-unionize; Ben Strauss & Steve Elder, College Players Granted Right to
Form Union, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/27/
sports/ncaafootball/national-labor-relations-board-rules-northwestern-players-are-employees-andcan-unionize.html.
DIVISION
I
MANUAL,
available
at
2. See
2015-2016
NCAA
https://www.ncaapublications.com/p-4388-2015-2016-ncaa-division-i-manual-august-versionavailable-august-2015.aspx. [hereinafater “NCAA Manual”]. NCAA rules are also known formally
as Bylaws; see, e.g., NCAA Manual 2.9, The Principle of Amateurism (“Student-athletes shall be
amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated primarily by
education and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student participation in
intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by
professional and commercial enterprises.”); see generally Adam Epstein & Paul Anderson, Utilization
of the NCAA Manual as a Teaching Tool, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. EDUC. 109, 118, 124 (2009); T. Matthew
Lockhart, Comment: Oliver v. NCAA: Throwing a Contractual Curveball at the NCAA’s “Veil of
Amateurism,” 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 175, 186 (2010) (noting the deference that courts have given
to the manner in which the NCAA defines and regulates amateurism according to its rules, more
formally known as bylaws).
3. See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 1, at 14, 21; see also Strauss & Elder, supra note
1. We recognize that the vast majority of colleges and universities are members of the NCAA but that
the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA) also exists for others as well. See
National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics, Member Schools, http://www.naia.org/
ViewArticle.dbml?DB_OEM_ID=27900&ATCLID=205322922 (last visited Oct. 8, 2015).
4. Josephine (Jo) R. Potuto, William H. Lyons & Kevin N. Rask, What’s in a Name? The
Collegiate Mark, the Collegiate Model, and the Treatment of Student-Athletes, 92 OR. L. REV. 879,
882 (2014).
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scholarship football players to unionize. 5 Specifically, the decision
concluded that Northwestern football players receive the substantial
economic benefit of scholarship money in exchange for performing
football-related services under what amounts to a contract for hire and
noted that the university’s football coaching staff exert a significant
amount of control over the players to such a degree that scholarships may
be revoked if players break team rules.6
Following this landmark decision, Northwestern University filed an
appeal with the NLRB in an effort to invalidate the regional decision. 7 On
August 17, 2015, the NLRB rejected the bid by football players at
Northwestern University to form a union in a unanimous seven-page
decision in which the board declined to assert jurisdiction in the case
because allowing athletes at a private university to organize would not
“promote stability in labor relations.” 8 Still, this case—which currently
maintains the status quo of student-athletes as amateurs—helped reignite
the sixty-year, heavily deliberated concern over whether student-athletes
should be paid to play. 9 While the NLRB overturned the Chicago district’s
5.
6.

See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 1.
WithumSmith+Brown, CPAs, A Win for Student Athletes or for the IRS?, DOUBLE
TAXATION: A TAX ON ALL THINGS TAXES (Apr. 8, 2014), http://double-taxation.com/2014/04/08/awin-for-student-athletes-or-for-the-irs/; see also Strauss and Elder, supra note 1 (addressing that the
NLRB’s ruling was based on various factors, to include the amount of time devoted to the sport of
football, the extent of control exercised by coaches, and the scholarship agreements entered into
between universities and student-athletes).
7. See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 1, at 13-14; see also Amanda Becker,
Northwestern University Appeals Decision Granting Football Team Union Vote, REUTERS (Apr. 9,
2014,
4:31
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/09/us-college-football-unionsidUSBREA381VT20140409.
8. Northwestern Univ. and College Athletes Players Ass’n (CAPA), 362 NLRB No. 167, 23, (Aug. 17, 2015). Michigan and Ohio soon passed and implemented laws barring student-athletes
from the right to unionize at all. See OHIO REV. CODE §3345.56 (West, Westlaw though Files 1 to 54
of the 131st General Assembly (2015-2016) and 2015 State Issues 1 and 2); Definitions; rights of
public employees, MICH. COMP. LAWS 423.201 (1(e)(iii))) (West, Westlaw through P.A.2016, No. 86
of the 2016 Regular Session, 98th Legislature). It should be noted that the case as presented was
specific to unionization at private universities, and did not specify how this decision could affect such
efforts at public universities in the future.
9. See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 1; see also Sean Gregory, It’s Time to Pay
College Athletes, TIME (Sept. 16, 2013), http://time.com/568/its-time-to-pay-college-athletes/;
EVENING INDEP. (Oct, 4, 1951), available at http://www.newspapers.com/newspage/3608625/
(reporting on University of Denver (DU) football player Ernest Nemeth’s filing of a worker’s
compensation claim against DU after injuring his back during spring football practice); State Comp.
Ins. Fund v. Indus. Comm’n, 314 P.2d 288 (Colo. 1957) (denying benefits to the widow of a
scholarship athlete killed during a football game); Rensing v. Indiana State University Bd. of Trs.,
444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983) (denying recovery to a football player who was rendered a quadriplegic
during a collegiate sporting event); Coleman v. Western Michigan Univ., 336 N.W.2d 224 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1983) (holding that a scholarship agreement between an athlete and institution does not entitle
the athlete to workers’ compensation); Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379, 382 (N.C. Ct.
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ruling, this Article explores the plausible federal tax consequences should
student-athletes in the future be deemed employees of their institutions. 10
The language of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) mandates that
earned income be taxable, no matter the source. 11 However, the IRC also
grants certain exclusions to this canon to include an accommodation that
an individual’s gross income excludes money received in the form of
qualified scholarships. 12 Thus far, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has
taken the position that so long as student-athletes are not “required” to
participate in any specific sport in exchange for scholarship awards, the
language of the IRC does not prevent students’ scholarships from being
deemed excludable qualified scholarships. 13 Thus, under the purview of
both the IRC and IRS, student-athletes receiving qualified scholarships do
not pay income taxes on scholarship moneys received. 14
From a federal income tax perspective, the significance of the
NLRB’s 2014 Northwestern case as a paradigm for future cases involving
student-athletes’ unionization mobilization efforts, in conjunction with
the recent decision in O’Bannon v. NCAA, where former Division I
athletes settled a $40 million suit against EA Sports for improperly using
their likenesses in video games, could redefine the principle that select
student-athletes are no longer unpaid amateurs receiving qualified
scholarships, but instead are employees of their institutions earning
scholarship funds in exchange for services rendered as college athletes. 15
Accordingly, a crucial question following the original NLRB holding was
whether the IRS can logically continue to treat qualified scholarships
received by student-athletes as excludable from gross income based on
the language of the IRC or instead reexamine the taxability of student-

App.), cert denied, 192 S.E.2d 197 (N.C. 1972) (excusing a university’s obligation to provide
financial assistance to a student-athlete who refused to play football as a result of his poor academic
showing).
10. See Sara Ganim, Labor Board: Northwestern University Football Players Can Unionize,
CNN (Mar. 27, 2014, 3:55 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/26/us/northwestern-football-union/;
see also WithumSmith+Brown, CPAs, supra note 6; Kathryn Kisska-Schulze & Adam Epstein, supra
note 1.
11. IRC § 61(a) (LEXIS 2015).
12. IRC § 117(a) (LEXIS 2015).
13. Potuto et al., supra note 4, at 890 n.40 (referencing commentary within note 40 with respect
to the exclusion of qualified scholarships from the parameters of IRC § 117(c)).
14. IRC § 117(c)(1) provides that the exclusion for qualified scholarships does not apply to
amounts received which represent “payment for teaching, research, or other services by the student
required as a condition for receiving the qualified scholarship . . . .”
15. See Tom Farrey, Players, Game Makers Settle for $40M, USA TODAY (May 31, 2014),
http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/11010455/college-athletes-reach-40-million-settlement-easports-ncaa-licensing-arm; see also O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 962-63 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
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athletes’ qualified scholarships. 16
The momentum of law surrounding student-athletes’ employment
characterization indicates that qualified scholarships could be heavily
scrutinized in the future and found to fall within the scope of taxable
federal income. The purpose of this Article, then, is to analyze the
potential taxability of qualified scholarships should student-athletes be
deemed employees of their institutions. To achieve this objective, Part II
offers a brief history of judicial scrutiny surrounding the pay-for-play
model within college athletics; Part III analyzes the language of the IRC
and related Treasury Regulations as they apply to qualified scholarships;
Part IV evaluates the potential characterization of student-athletes as
employees of their universities; and Part V concludes that the IRS and
courts may categorize at least some scholarship athletes as employees of
their institutions in the future, which may cultivate a new era in the taxing
of qualified scholarships under federal income tax law. 17
II. THE NLRB V. NORTHWESTERN—THE PAY-FOR-PLAY MODEL GAINS
TRACTION
After Johnny Manziel first flashed his infamous “show me the
money” hand gesture during the 2013 NCAA college football season, the
issue of paying student-athletes has garnered heavy media attention. 18
16. See David Murphy & Christopher Amundsen, What Exactly is the Long-Term Impact of
the NLRB’s Decision? Part 3, DORSEY (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.dorsey.com/eu-nlrb-decisioncollege-athletes-and-unions-pt3/. It should be noted that in addition to the NCAA’s principle of
amateurism, the NCAA currently considers pay as an extra benefit, a term that could render a studentathlete ineligible for competition. See NCAA MANUAL 12.1.2, Amateur Status (“An individual loses
amateur status and thus shall not be eligible for intercollegiate competition in a particular sport if the
individual: (a) Uses his or her athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport;
(b) Accepts a promise of pay even if such pay is to be received following completion of intercollegiate
athletics participation; (c) Signs a contract or commitment of any kind to play professional athletics,
regardless of its legal enforceability or any consideration received, except as permitted in Bylaw
12.2.5.1; . . . (d) Receives, directly or indirectly, a salary, reimbursement of expenses or any other
form of financial assistance from a professional sports organization based on athletics skill or
participation, except as permitted by NCAA rules and regulations; (e) Competes on any professional
athletics team per Bylaw 12.02.8, even if no pay or remuneration for expenses was received, except
as permitted in Bylaw 12.2.3.2.1; (f ) After initial full-time collegiate enrollment, enters into a
professional draft (see Bylaw 12.2.4); (g) Enters into an agreement with an agent.”).
17. The purpose of this Article is to specifically address specified federal income tax
implications on the pay-for-play model of college sports. Although the authors acknowledge that state
and local taxes will likewise have an impact on this model, such analysis is outside the scope of this
Article. For more information on the state tax implications of paying student-athletes, see KisskaSchulze & Epstein, supra note 1.
18. See, e.g., Gregory, supra note 9; see also Sharon Terlep & Ben Cohen, Judge Rules Against
NCAA Ban on Paying Players, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/judge-rulesagainst-ncaa-ban-on-paying-players-1407539820; Steve Siebold, It’s Time to Pay College Athletes,
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However, while currently on the front line of public debate, the
investigation into whether student-athletes should be paid is not a new
phenomenon. 19 The origin of this discussion arose in the 1950s in
Colorado when the judicial system first embarked on analyses of whether
injured student-athletes qualified for workers’ compensation under state
law. 20
Courts in different jurisdictions have used several analyses to
determine whether students are considered employees of their
universities. Colorado has considered whether student-athletes were
entitled to workers’ compensation for injuries sustained. 21 Other state
cases have consistently sided with arguments of the NCAA and member
universities in finding that student athletes are unpaid amateurs. 22 The
O’Bannon case demonstrates an evolution in the law as athletes have
gained rights to some form of financial remuneration generated in their
role with the university. 23 This culminated in the case of NLRB v.
Northwestern, which considered football players’ ability to unionize. 24
In University of Denver v. Nemeth, the Colorado Supreme Court
found that Ernest Nemeth, a college football player who had also been
employed and compensated by the university in various capacities in
HUFFINGTON POST (last updated Oct. 13, 2014, 5:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stevesiebold/its-time-to-pay-college-athletes_b_5672988.html; Andrew Steadman, College Athletics For
Sale?, 8 U. FLA. L. REV. 10 (2014), available at https://www.law.ufl.edu/uflaw/feature/collegeathletics-for-sale (cover story of the University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law Annual
Report Issue); Skip Bayless, Unleash the Boosters—drop the false idol of amateurism in college
sports, ESPN COLLEGE FOOTBALL (July 25, 2014), http://espn.go.com/collegefootball/story/_/id/11260822/college-football-paying-athletes.
19. See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 1; see also Dennis A. Johnson & John
Acquaviva, Point/Counterpoint: Paying College Athletes, SPORT J. (June 15, 2012),
http://thesportjournal.org/article/pointcounterpoint-paying- college-athletes/ (exploring the history
and evolution of the discussion of whether or not student-athletes should be paid); Gregory, supra
note 9 (arguing that because college sports equate to mass entertainment, it is time to reward players
for their work).
20. See, e.g., Univ. of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1953); see also Univ. of Denver
v. Indus. Comm’n of Colorado, 335 P.2d 292 (Colo. 1959) (holding that private agreements may
neither violate public policy nor abrogate statutory requirements or conditions affecting the public
policy of the state. Nemeth, whose compensation had been awarded incrementally and who asked for
additional workers’ compensation due to a change in his condition, was granted a reopening of his
case.); State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Indus. Comm’n, 314 P.2d 288 (Colo. 1957) (denying benefits to the
widow of a student-athlete killed during a football game).
21. See, e.g., Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423; see also Univ. of Denver v. Indus. Comm’n of Colorado,
335 P.2d 292.
22. See, e.g., State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Indus. Comm’n, 34 P.2d 288.
23. See O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1007-08 (N.D. Cal.), aff’d in part and rev’d
in part, O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. Cal. 2015).
24. Northwestern Univ. and College Athletes Players Ass’n (CAPA), 362 N.L.R.B. No. 44
(2015).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol49/iss4/1

6

Kisska-Schulze and Epstein: Taxing Qualified Scholarships
1 - KISSKA-SCHULTZE MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

TAXING QUALIFIED SCHOLARSHIPS

8/11/2016 12:34 PM

777

exchange for his participation on the football team, qualified for workers’
compensation after sustaining injuries during a football practice.25 Four
years later, in State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Industrial
Commission, the Colorado Supreme Court denied workers’ compensation
benefits to the widow of a student-athlete killed during a football game,
finding no existence of a contractual obligation to play football between
the decedent and the university, thereby negating any claim for
compensation. 26 During that same decade, the NCAA coined the term
“student-athlete,” which the organization then rapidly embedded into all
of its rules and interpretations. 27
Following the early Colorado workers’ compensation decisions,
several other state courts heard similar claims made by student-athletes,
and consistently followed the NCAA’s position that student-athletes are
not employees of their universities. 28 For over half a century, the NCAA
and its member institutions have rigorously defended that student-athletes
are unpaid amateurs. 29 However, the more recent surge in financial
benefits afforded to the NCAA and its member institutions from lucrative
television rights has increased scrutiny over whether some portion of this
wealth should be directed towards student-athletes themselves. 30
25. Nemeth, 257 P.2d. at 430.
26. State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Indus. Comm’n, 314 P.2d at 289-90.
27. See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 1 at 20; see also Taylor Branch, The Shame of
College Sports, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/theshame-of-college-sports/308643/ (“We crafted the term student-athlete,” Walter Byers [the NCAA’s
first Executive Director] himself wrote, “and soon it was embedded in all NCAA rules and
interpretations.”).
28. See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 1; see also, e.g., Rensing v. Ind. State Univ. Bd.
of Trs., 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1175 (Ind. 1983) (reversing and holding that the resulting disability to the
scholarship athlete nevertheless did not establish that either party had the intent to enter into an
employer-employee relationship); Coleman v. W. Mich. Univ., 336 N.W.2d 224 (Mich. Ct. App.
1983) (holding that WMU had little control over Coleman, and even if it did, Coleman’s football
skills were not an integral part of WMU’s school business); Waldrep v. Texas Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n, 21
S.W.3d 692 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that TCU did not direct or control all of Waldrep’s
activities as a football player before suffering his spinal cord injury which led to paralysis). But see
Van Horn v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963) (holding in favor of
the wife of California State Polytechnic football team member who successfully brought a workers’
compensation claim to recover for the death of her husband as a result of a plane crash while returning
from a game).
29. Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 1.
30. Id.; see also Joe Nocera, Let’s Start Paying College Athletes, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/magazine/lets-start-paying-collegeathletes.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (“And what does the labor force have that makes it possible for
coaches to earn millions, and causes marketers to spend billions, get? Nothing. The workers are
supposed to be content with a scholarship that does not even cover the full cost of attending college.
Any student athlete who accepts an unapproved, free hamburger from a coach, or even a fan, is in
violation of N.C.A.A. rules.”).
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Although the NCAA has not officially amended its posture on the
pay-for-play model, recent court cases, coupled with the March 2014
NLRB ruling, have made significant strides in attempting to establish that
student-athletes are more than mere unpaid amateurs. 31 In 2009, Sam
Keller, a former Division I college quarterback, and Ed O’Bannon, a
former UCLA basketball player, merged separately-filed lawsuits into a
single suit against the NCAA, labeled the NCAA v. Student-Athlete Name
& Likeness Licensing Litigation. 32 Keller, O’Bannon, and a group of
former and current Division I student-athletes claimed that the
characteristics of the players in the NCAA Football video series mirrored
theirs and those of other actual college athletes, violating their right of
publicity and image rights. 33 In addition to seeking damages from the use
of their likenesses in video games, the O’Bannon suit further claimed the
NCAA was violating federal antitrust law in preventing student-athletes
from capitalizing on their names and likenesses, specifically with regard
to the use of their likenesses in Electronic Arts (EA) Sports’ video
games. 34
After years of court filings, in May and June 2014, both EA Sports
and the NCAA offered settlement agreements to the plaintiffs involved in
the NCAA v. Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation
case. 35 The settlement culminated with a $40 million agreement in which
EA Sports paid the plaintiffs for improperly using the likenesses of
student-athletes. 36 In addition, for the first time in NCAA history, the
organization agreed to pay $20 million to student-athletes for rights
relating to their play on the field and for their contribution to the profitable
nature of college athletics. 37
Following these settlement agreements, a series of legal decisions

31. See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 1; see also, Mark Koba, Student-Athletes to Get
(Aug.
12,
2014,
7:23
AM),
Paid?
It
Looks
That
Way,
NBC NEWS
http://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/student-athletes-get- paid-it-looks-way-n178131.
32. See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 1, at 22; see also, Keller v. Elec. Arts. Inc. (In
re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013); John
Wolohan, Update on O’Bannon v. NCAA, LAWINSPORT (Mar. 31, 2014),
http://www.lawinsport.com/articles/intellectual-property-law/item/update-on-o-bannon-v-ncaa
(discussing the merger of lawsuits filed against the NCAA).
33. Keller, 724 F.3d at 1271-73; see also Wolohan, supra note 32.
34. See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 1 at 22-23; see also Wolohan, supra note 32
(discussing the various lawsuits involved by and the specific issues brought forth against the NCAA).
35. See Farrey, supra note 15.
36. Id.
37. See Rob Dauster, NCAA Settles for $20 Million in Keller v. NCAA Lawsuit, NBC SPORTS
(Jun. 9, 2014, 2:31 PM), http://collegebasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2014/06/09/ncaa-settles-for-20million-in-keller-v-ncaa-lawsuit/.
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emerged, demonstrating that the judicial branch did not share the same
position on amateurism as the NCAA. For example, on August 8, 2014, a
California district court judge ruled in favor of O’Bannon, who had
continued his federal antitrust lawsuit against the NCAA. 38 This decision
resulted in a short-lived rejection of the NCAA’s principle of
“amateurism,” though it did not affect the NCAA’s current stance on not
paying student athletes under a pay-for-play model. 39 However, according
to the decision, beginning in 2016 universities could have offered select
football and basketball players individual trust funds that could be
accessed after graduation. 40 Senior District Judge Claudia Wilken of the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California held that the
relevant NCAA member institutions may provide deferred compensation
of $5,000 or less. 41 Almost immediately thereafter, in October of 2014 the
University of Texas’s athletics director had announced the intention to
pay each of its student-athletes a sum of money covering the cost of
attendance, coupled with its deferred compensation for likeness rights,
beginning fall 2015. 42 The O’Bannon decision did not affect the NCAA’s
38. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (Per this ruling, the NCAA
has the ability to cap compensation at $5,000 per year above the value of full college scholarships.);
see also Koba, supra note 31 (documenting the O’Bannon decision).
39. See Tom Farrey, Ed O’Bannon: Ruling is Tip of Iceberg, ESPN (Aug. 10, 2014, 10:09
AM),
http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/11332816/ed-obannon-says-antitrust-ruling-onlybeginning-change (noting that the O’Bannon decision is a significant start towards the outright
rejection of the NCAA’s amateurism model); see also Rick Maese, O’Bannon v. NCAA Ruling Could
Set Up Larger Arguments over College Sports, Experts Say, THE WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 9, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/obannon-v-ncaa-rulingcould-set-up-largerarguments-over-college-sports-experts-say/2014/08/09/5338ae4c-1fe2-11e4-9b6c12e30cbe86a3_story.html (detailing that in the aftermath of the O’Bannon decision, the NCAA “has
given no indication it is eager to embrace any form of pay-for-play model”).
40. Ben Strauss & Marc Tracy, N.C.A.A. Must Allow College to Pay Athletes, Judge Rules,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/09/sports/federal-judge-rules-againstncaa-in-obannon-case.html?_r=0 (noting that football players in the top ten conferences and all
Division I men’s basketball players could be offered trust funds which can be accessed after
graduation, giving players an opportunity to share the television revenue they help generate for their
colleges and the NCAA).
41. Judge Rules Against NCAA, ESPN (Aug. 9, 2014, 6:20 PM), http://espn.go.com/collegesports/story/_/id/11328442/judge-rules-ncaa-ed-obannon-antitrust-case (U.S. District Judge Claudia
Wilken, in a 99-page decision finding in favor of O’Bannon, found that “the NCAA rules
unreasonably restrain trade in the market for certain educational and athletic opportunities offered by
NCAA Division I schools.” However, she did rule that individual schools can offer less money so
long as they do not unlawfully conspire among themselves to set those amounts.).
42. See Zach Barnett, Texas Will Begin Paying Each of Its Athletes $10,000 A Year, FOOTBALL
SCOOP (Oct. 22, 2014), http://footballscoop.com/news/texas-will-begin-paying-athletes-10000-year/;
see also Jason McIntyre, Texas is NOT Paying Each Athlete $10,000, But AD Steve Patterson Said
They Might if UT Loses in Court, THE BIG LEAD (Oct. 22, 2014, 11:46 PM),
http://thebiglead.com/2014/10/22/texas-is-not-paying-each-athlete-10000-but-ad-steve-pattersonsaid-they-might-if-ut-loses-in-court/ (disputing the original claim that Texas will pay each student-
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stance on the pay-for-play model, but the 2014 NLRB ruling appeared to
open the door for student-athletes to be deemed employees of their
institutions. 43
Then, on March 26, 2014, the NLRB ruled that Northwestern
University football players qualified as employees of the institution and
could unionize and bargain collectively. 44 In making its decision, the
NLRB distinguished its ruling from that of its 2004 Brown University
decision where it held that graduate research assistants were not university
employees eligible for union representation. 45 The NLRB reasoned that
Brown University graduate assistants’ activities were primarily
educational, whereas Northwestern University athletes’ activities were
largely “economic.” 46 This ruling specifically established that
Northwestern scholarship football players could unionize based on certain
factors, including the extent of time devoted to their sport, the level of
control exerted by coaches, and their scholarship agreements. 47 However,
following this decision, Northwestern University immediately filed an
appeal with the NLRB in Washington, D.C., which proved to be fatal to
the impact of the 2014 decision. 48
Later, Samantha Sackos, a former soccer player at the University of
Houston, filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana naming the NCAA and all NCAA Division I member

athlete $10,000, but noting that such payment will occur if the University of Texas loses in court).
43. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
44. See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 1 at 13-14; see also Bennett, supra note 1;
Strauss & Elder, supra note 1.
45. See Joel Barras, NLRB Regional Director Says College Athletes Can Unionize, FORBES
(March 27, 2014, 12:06 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/theemploymentbeat/2014/03/27/nlrbregional-director-says-college- athletes-can-unionize/; see also Brown Univ. and Int’l Union, Case
No. 1-RC-21368, slip op. 342 N.L.R.B. 42 (2004) available at http://www.google.com/
url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CB4QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2
Fmynlrb.nlrb.gov%2Flink%2Fdocument.aspx%2F09031d45800076ac&ei=P8yJVNWQKqPasATnt
ILABA&usg=A
FQjCNEEQblAf_mbwIJ5xesCybHQd9jug&sig2=xUpCeOWQxvFncEWiHHfXKQ&bvm=bv.81456516,d.cWc
(last visited Feb. 23, 2015).
46. See Brown Univ., Case 1-RC-21368, slip op. 342 N.L.R.B. 42 (2004); see also Sara Hebel,
Employees or Not? Graduate-Student Assistants Versus Scholarship Athletes, CHRON. OF HIGHER
EDUC. (Mar. 27, 2014), https://chronicle.com/article/Employees-or-Not-/145573/ (analyzing the
Brown University decision, in which the NLRB ruled that “students serving as graduate-student
assistants spend only a limited number of hours performing their duties, and it is beyond dispute that
their principal time commitment at Brown is focused on obtaining a degree and, thus, being a
student”).
47. See Strauss & Elder, supra note 1.
48. Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 1, at 14; see also Becker, supra note 7. In 2015, the
NLRB overruled the 2014 decision. See Northwestern Univ., 362 NLRB No. 167 (Aug. 17, 2015).
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institutions as defendants. 49 The suit alleged that the NCAA and its
Division I member schools violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
by failing to pay college athletes for hours worked while practicing and
playing college sports. 50 This complaint asserted that students who
participate in paid, work-study, part-time employment programs are
treated differently than NCAA Division I student-athletes pursuant to
NCAA Bylaws, and contends that student-athletes meet the criteria for
recognition as temporary employees of NCAA Division I member schools
under the FLSA. 51 Sackos claimed that since student-athletes receive no
academic credit for participating on a sports team, they should be
characterized as employees under the FLSA. 52
All of these examples—from the early Colorado workers’
compensation rulings to the Northwestern University (NLRB), Keller, and
O’Bannon decisions to the Sackos filing—continued to shape the debate
over whether student-athletes should be paid. 53 As the idea of paying
student-athletes continues to gain traction, an important issue to consider
is whether student-athletes, ultimately characterized as employees of their
institutions, could eventually be taxed on scholarship moneys received
from their institutions. While the language in the IRC generally excludes
qualified scholarships from federal taxation, changing the nature of the
relationship between student-athletes and their universities could
transform the manner in which the IRS classifies scholarship income. 54
49. Sackos v. NCAA, No. 1:14-CV-1710 WTL-MJD (S.D. Ind. Oct. 20, 2014), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/243718053/Samantha-Sackos-v-NCAA-and-NCAADivision-IMember-Schools (last visited Oct. 9, 2015).
50. Id. See also Jonathan L. Israel, The Next Cleat Drops . . . College Athletes Sue for Unpaid
&
EMPLOYMENT
LAW
PERSPECTIVES
(Nov.
3,
2014),
Wages,
LABOR
http://www.laboremploymentperspectives.com/2014/11/03/the- next-cleat-drops-college-athletessue-for-unpaid-wages/.
51. Sackos, No. 1:14-CV-1710 WTL-MJD.
52. Id.; see also Kevin Trahan, Lawsuit Alleges NCAA is Breaking Minimum Wage Laws,
SBNATION (Oct. 22, 2014, 6:19 PM), http://www.sbnation.com/2014/10/22/7042297/lawsuitalleges-ncaa-is-breaking-minimum-wage-laws; But see Steve Berkowitz, Judge Dismisses NCAA
Wage Lawsuit Involving Penn Track Athletes, USA TODAY (Feb. 17, 2016) (offering that U.S. District
Court (S.D. Ind.) Judge William T. Lawrence dismissed the [Sackos] case against over 100 Division
I NCAA member schools holding that Congress did not intend the FLSA to apply to student-athletes
in the first place). The authors note that since the time of the original Sackos filing, Sackos actually
resigned from the case and former University of Pennsylvania Women’s Track and Field athletes
Gillian Berger, Lauren Anderson, and Taylor Henning became the named plaintiffs in the lawsuit.
See Berger v. NCAA, Cover Letter to Amended Complaint, Civil Action No. 1:14-CV-1710 WTLMJD.
53. NLRB v. Northwestern, 2014 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 221, 2014-15 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15,781
(2014); Keller v. NCAA 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71433 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2014); O’Bannon v.
NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Sackos, No. 1:14-CV-1710 WTL-MJD.
54. See IRC § 117(a) (LEXIS 2015); see also Michael Sanserino, College Athletes Union
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As such, an understanding of the taxability of qualified scholarships in the
wake of the NLRB’s 2014 Northwestern decision, though it was later
overturned and dismissed the following year, is critical in identifying the
potential impact such a decision could have on student-athletes’
scholarship funds in the future. 55
III. HISTORY IN THE MAKING—TAXING ATHLETIC SCHOLARSHIPS IN
THE WAKE OF THE NLRB’S 2014 NORTHWESTERN DECISION
The Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution authorizes
Congress to tax income, no matter the source.56 On October 3, 1913, the
same year that the Sixteenth Amendment took effect, Congress approved
a tax on the net income of individuals and corporations. 57 Since the 1954
revision of the IRC, the language of Code Section 61 explicitly defines
the term “gross income” to include “all income from whatever source
derived.” 58
The following sections discuss how the compensation of student
athletes is viewed by the IRS, and analyzes the Supreme Court rulings that
have tried to define compensation. Subsection III.A explores how the IRS
taxes qualified scholarships. Subsection III.B covers the limiting
definition of “compensation for services rendered.” The Court has held
that scholarship money that is really compensation for services is taxable
under the quid pro quo analysis of Bingler. However, the IRS and courts
considering the issue have not applied the quid pro quo Bingler analysis
directly to student-athletes’ scholarships. If the issue is considered by the
IRS and courts, it is likely that the portion of student-athlete scholarships
that are deemed “compensation for services rendered” will be taxable
income.
The IRC purposefully grants certain exclusions to the Section 61
canon, including an accommodation under Section 117 that an
individual’s gross income exclude money received in the form of qualified
Raises Tax, Discrimination Questions, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Apr. 6, 2014, 12:07 AM),
http://www.post- gazette.com/business/employment/2014/04/06/College-athletes-union-raises-taxdiscrimination- questions/stories/201404030298 (noting that a change in employment
characterization of student-athletes at the universities they play for may require that the IRS look
more closely at the taxability of scholarship money).
55. NLRB v. Northwestern, 2014 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 221; but see Northwestern Univ. and
College Athletes Players Association (CAPA), 362 NLRB No. 167 (Aug. 17, 2015).
56. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
57. See REVENUE ACT OF 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114 (1913), last amended by Pub. L. 95-600,
92 Stat. 2763 (1978); see also Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S.
International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1022 (1997) (providing a brief history of U.S. taxation).
58. IRC § 61(a) (LEXIS 2015).
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scholarships. 59 An important limitation to this exclusion requires that if
any “portion of scholarship money received . . . represents a payment for
teaching, research or other services by the student required as a condition
for receiving the qualified scholarship . . . ,” such funds are taxable. 60
From a federal income tax perspective, the significance of the
NLRB’s 2014 Northwestern decision lay in the interpretation of whether,
as employees of their private institution, Northwestern University football
players—along with other student-athletes in similar situations—would
be found to receive some or all of their scholarship money in exchange
for services required as a condition for receiving their scholarship
money. 61 To advance this issue, an understanding of IRC Section 117 and
the corresponding Treasury Regulations is necessary. 62
A. Taxing Qualified Scholarships—Understanding IRC Section 117
Prior to the middle of the twentieth century, no specific exclusion
existed within the language of the IRC governing the omission of
scholarship money from the parameters of federal income taxation.63 Such
a bright line tenet was not implemented into the structure of the IRC until
the Congressional enactment of Code Section 117 in 1954, which
specifically excluded scholarship and fellowship grants from the
taxability of gross income. 64
The original scholarship exclusion was largely eroded in 1986 when
Congress required (1) that scholarships be taxable to the extent of the
value of services provided, (2) limited the exclusions for degree
candidates to amounts for qualified tuition and related expenses, and (3)
compelled that all grants for living expenses be taxable.65 A primary
objective of the federal government enacting Section 117 was to
encourage and provide access to students seeking higher education,
59. See IRC § 117(a) (LEXIS 2015).
60. IRC § 117(c) (LEXIS 2015).
61. NLRB v. Northwestern, 2014 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 221, 2014-15 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15,781
(2014).
62. IRC § 117(a); Treas. Reg., §§ 1.117-1(a), 1.117-3(b), and 1.117-4(c) (LEXIS through Oct.
28, 2015 issue of the Fed. Register).
63. Richard C.E. Beck, Loan Repayment Assistance Programs for Public-Interest Lawyers:
Why Does Everyone Think They are Taxable?, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 251, 258 (1996) (Providing a
brief history of tax exclusions for scholarships); see also Mimi Sharamitaro, Comment: The Federal
Tax System and Treatment of Scholarships For Graduate Students: Should Scholarships Be Taxed?,
48 ST. LOUIS L.J. 1501, 1502-03 (2004) (noting that prior to 1954, scholarships were excludible under
the general provision of the Internal Revenue Code exempting gifts).
64. See IRC § 117 (LEXIS 2015); see also Beck, supra note 63, at 258.
65. See Beck, supra note 63, at 260-61; see also Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514,
123, 100 Stat. 2085, 2112 (codified at IRC § 117(a) (1994)); IRC § 117(b) (LEXIS 2015).
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notwithstanding income level.66 Today, Section 117 excludes from gross
income amounts received as qualified scholarships by individuals who are
candidates for degrees at educational institutions. 67 It is the sole
Congressional provision excluding such amounts from gross income. 68
Generally, the term “qualified scholarship” includes amounts
received by individuals as scholarship funds used for qualified tuition and
related expenses, including fees, books, supplies, and equipment required
for courses of instruction, to aid in the pursuit of study or research. 69 In
order to be treated as related expenses, fees, books, supplies, and
equipment must be required of all students in the specified course of
instruction. 70 Scholarship money used for incidental expenses, such as
room, board, travel, and research, is not excludable from gross income. 71
Section 117 further mandates that scholarship recipients be
candidates for a degree at an educational organization to qualify for the
tax exclusion. 72 Specifically, amounts paid to an individual to help pursue
their studies or to conduct research are considered Section 117 scholarship
amounts “if the primary purpose of the studies or research is to further the
education and training of the recipient in his individual capacity . . . .” 73
Such requirement entails that the student attend a primary or secondary
school or be an undergraduate or graduate student pursuing a degree at a
66. See Sharamitaro, supra note 63, at 1503.
67. See IRC § 117(a); see also IRC § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) (defining the term “educational
organization” as “an educational organization which normally maintains a regular faculty and
curriculum and normally has a regularly enrolled body of pupils or student in attendance at the place
where its educational activities are regularly carried on”); Stuart Lazar, Schooling Congress: The
Current Landscape of the Tax Treatment of Higher Education Expenses and a Framework for Reform,
2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1047, 1083 (2010) (discussing the tax exclusion for scholarships and
fellowship grants).
68. See Lazar, supra note 67, at 1083-84; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.117-1(a) (LEXIS through
Oct. 28, 2015 issue of the Fed. Register).
69. IRC § 117(b)(1); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.117-3(a) (LEXIS through Oct. 28, 2015 issue of
the Fed. Register) (The term qualified scholarship also applies to fellowship grants received by
individuals and used for qualified tuition and related expenses.); Lazar, supra note 67, at 1084
(discussing the inclusion of related expenses within the parameter of IRC Section 117); IRC §
117(b)(2)(A) (defining the term “qualified tuition and related expenses” as “tuition and fees required
for the enrollment or attendance of a student at an educational organization . . . .”).
70. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-6(c)(2), 53 Fed. Reg. 21688 (Jun. 9, 1988).
71. IRC § 117(b)(1); see also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-6(c)(2); Lazar, supra note 67, at 1084
(noting those items associated with scholarship and fellowship grants which are includable in gross
income).
72. IRC § 117(a); see also IRC § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) (defining the term “educational
organization” as a facility that “normally maintains a regular faculty and curriculum and normally has
a regularly enrolled body of pupils or students in attendance at the place where its educational
activities are regularly carried on”); Treas. Reg. § 1.117-3(b) (LEXIS through the Nov. 4, 2015 issue
of the Fed. Register).
73. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c)(2) (1988).
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college or university. 74
Although Section 117 and the applicable Treasury Regulations offer
tax exclusions for scholarship recipients pursing educational studies or
research, a key limitation applies if any scholarship amounts “represent
either compensation for past, present, or future employment services or
represents payment for services which are subject to the direction or
supervision of the grantor.” 75 Prior to 1986, students receiving funds
representing payment for services could exclude such amounts received
from their gross income so long as all candidates were performing the
same services. 76 However, such exclusion was repealed by the Tax
Reform Act of 1986. 77
Under the present Code, IRS Regulations clarify that scholarship
amounts paid to recipients representing compensation or payment for
services are specifically not excludable from gross income. 78 Treasury
Regulation § 1.117-4(c), promulgated under Code Section 117,
purposefully identifies scholarship amounts representing compensation
for services as includable in gross income and therefore taxable.79 In 1969,
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of Treasury Regulation §
1.117-4(c), denying a scholarship exclusion from gross income where
tuition represented compensation for services.80 Therefore, an
understanding of the language of this Treasury Regulation, along with
judicial interpretations, follows.
B. Compensation for Services Rendered—Treasury Regulation § 1.1174(c) and Judicial Interpretation.
The IRC has specific statutory sections in place governing qualified
scholarship funds. Both the U.S. Supreme Court and Tax Court have
applied the applicable Treasury Regulations to scholarship recipients and
74. Lazar, supra note 67, at 1084-85 (noting the IRC Section 117 requirements that an
individual receiving a scholarship or grant be a candidate for degree at a qualified educational
organization); see also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-6(c)(4) 53 Fed. Reg. 21688 (Jun. 9, 1988).
75. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c)(1) (LEXIS through Nov. 4, 2015 issue of the Fed. Register).
76. Sharamitaro, supra note 63, at 1502-04.
77. Id.; see also Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2112 (1986).
78. See IRC § 117(c)(1) (LEXIS 2015); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c)(2).
79. See Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c).
80. See Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969) (finding that respondent-engineers,
participating in a fellowship program which required both a “work-study” obligation requiring that
they work part-time while attending university classes, and a “research” obligation which provided
respondents a leave of absence to work on their doctoral dissertations, was taxable because
respondents had provided services in exchange for their scholarship money); see also Adam Hoeflich,
Note, The Taxation of Athletic Scholarships: A Problem of Consistency, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 581,
589-92 (1991).
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have consistently held that there must be a quid pro quo in order for the
scholarship funds to be taxable. 81 In situations in which students’
scholarship money is dependent upon rendering services to the university,
the Courts have held that the funds are taxable income. 82
The primary objective of Treasury Regulation § 1.117-4 is to
earmark circumstances where tuition remission represents compensation
for services, and thereby deny the application of the Section 117
scholarship exclusion from taxability. 83 Payments are not considered
scholarship amounts or fellowship grants if: (1) the amount represents
compensation for “past, present or future employment purposes,” (2) the
activity the scholarship or grant payment funds is “subject to the direction
or supervision of the grantor,” or (3) the amount paid enables the recipient
“to pursue studies or research primarily for the benefit of the grantor.” 84
Over the years, various courts have scrutinized the application of
Treasury Regulation § 1.117-4(c) to scholarship recipients. 85 However,
the premier case characterizing the proper application of this regulation is
Bingler v. Johnson. 86 In Bingler, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
taxpayers who provide services in exchange for their scholarship grants—
quid pro quo—may not exclude the value of such grants from their gross
income. 87 The taxpayers in this case—engineers at Westinghouse—
sought to exclude amounts received by their employer from income while
attending graduate school in pursuit of their Ph.D. degrees. 88 The
respondents in Bingler participated in a fellowship program requiring both
work-study and research obligations. 89 The work-study segment entailed
that the respondents work part-time and obtain a part-time release from
81. E.g., Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969); Willie v. Comm’r, 57 T.C. 383, 386 (1971).
82. E.g., Bingler, 394 U.S. 741; Willie, 57 T.C. at 386.
83. See Wendy Gerzog Shaller, The New Fringe Benefit Legislation: A Codification of
Historical Inequities, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 425, 434 (1985).
84. See Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c)(1), (2).
85. See e.g., Willie 57 T.C. at 386 (1971) (Petitioner, an instructor employed by the Biloxi
School District, participated in an education program funded through the U.S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW). Although not required, the Biloxi School District encouraged
teachers to participate in the program with the goal of improving the education of children and
providing teachers with teaching and coping methods to be utilized in the newly desegregated schools
in the area. Petitioner did not include the reimbursed amount of his attendance in his taxable income
for the year at issue. Finding that the payments received by the HEW represented compensation for
services rendered, the U.S. Tax Court held that petitioner’s participation in the training program was
primarily for the benefit of the Biloxi School District, and therefore includable in his gross income.).
86. 394 U.S. 741 (1969).
87. Hoeflich, supra note 80, at 589.
88. See Bingler, 394 U.S. at 742; see also Gary C. Randall, Athletic Scholarships and Taxes:
Or a Touchdown In Taxes, 7 GONZ. L. REV. 297, 300 (1972) (reviewing the Bingler case in detail).
89. See Bingler, 394 U.S. at 742-44; see also Hoeflich, supra note 80, at 589-90.
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work to attend university classes, while the research obligation allowed
the respondents a leave of absence from employment to work on their
doctoral dissertations. 90 Westinghouse paid the respondents’ tuition and
expenses during the work-study phase, as well as a stipend during the
research phase of the program. 91 The taxpayers contended that the
stipends received from Westinghouse during the research phase of the
fellowship program were scholarship amounts and should be excludable
from gross income. 92
Endorsing the legitimacy of Treasury Regulation 1.117-4(c) in its
review of this case, the Bingler Court remarked:
[T]he definitions supplied by the Regulation clearly are prima facie
proper, comporting as they do with the ordinary understanding of
“scholarships” and “fellowships” as relatively disinterested, “nostrings” educational grants, with no requirement of any substantial quid
pro quo from the recipients. 93

In making this statement, the U.S. Supreme Court stressed the importance
of the quid pro quo test, maintaining that students who provide services in
exchange for scholarships or grants may not exclude their awards from
gross income. 94 Specifically, the Court held that a payment cannot be
earmarked as a scholarship in circumstances “where the recipient receives
money, and in return provides a quid pro quo.” 95 Thus, any amounts
received in return for services rendered are treated as compensation rather
than scholarship funds. 96
Apart from Bingler, interpreting Code Section 117 and its applicable
Treasury Regulations has been articulated in various U.S. Tax Court
reviews. 97 In Bonn v. Commissioner, the U.S. Tax Court held that funds
90. Bingler, 394 U.S. at 743-44; see also Hoeflich, supra note 80, at 590.
91. Bingler 394 U.S. at 743 (the stipends received from Westinghouse ranged from 70-90% of
the respondents’ prior salaries); see also Hoeflich, supra note 80, at 590.
92. Bingler, 394 U.S. at 744-45 (Westinghouse, under its in-house accounting program, listed
the stipend paid to the respondents as “indirect labor” expenses, and withheld the appropriate federal
income tax from those amounts paid. Respondents subsequently filed claims for income tax refunds);
see also Hoeflich, supra note 80, at 590.
93. Bingler, 394 U.S. at 751; see also Randall, supra note 88, at 300.
94. Hoeflich, supra note 80, at 591.
95. Bingler, 394 U.S. at 758 (quoting Brief for Petitioner 22); see also Jonathan M. Layman,
Comment: Forgiven but Not Forgotten: Taxation of Forgiven Student Loans Under the Income-Based
Repayment Plan, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 131, 149 (2011).
96. See Prop. Treas. Reg. 1.117-6(d)(2) (1988); see also Ernest R. Larkins, Coming To
America: International Students Face a Labyrinth of Income Tax Issues, 15 CONN. J. INT’L. L. 47, 70
(2000).
97. Bingler, 394 U.S.. See, e.g., Bonn v. Comm’r, 34 T.C. 64 (1960); Proskey v. Comm’r, 51
T.C. 918 (1969).
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received by a physician in exchange for services provided to a Veterans’
Administration (VA) hospital under a fellowship program constituted
compensation for services rather than a fellowship grant. 98 In making this
determination, the Court found that the VA hospital existed primarily for
patient care and that the needs of the fellowship training program were
incidental to the valuable services, which petitioner provided to assist in
the care and treatment of patients in exchange for compensation. 99
Similarly, in Proskey v. Commissioner, the U.S. Tax Court sustained the
Commissioner of Revenue’s determination that a stipend received by the
taxpayer, a resident physician, in exchange for his supervisory role over
medical students, interns, and assistant residents constituted
compensation for services rendered to the hospital rather than a fellowship
grant. 100
In Zolnay v. Commissioner, the U.S. Tax Court held that payments
received by a Ph.D. candidate from his institution were taxable as
compensation for services rendered and therefore not excludable as a
scholarship or fellowship grant. 101 In this case, the petitioner, a Ph.D.
candidate in electrical engineering, performed studies for the Ohio State
University as a research assistant. 102 In exchange for his required fortyhour work weeks, the petitioner received monthly compensation. 103 The
Court, concluding that such payments were compensation in exchange for
98. Bonn, 34 T.C. 64 Petitioner, a physician, was accepted into a fellowship program operated
by the Menninger Foundation, and was appointed by the Veterans’ Administration (VA) to a
psychiatry residency at a VA hospital under a fellowship program. In consideration for petitioner’s
services, which included supervising course instruction and training in psychiatry, neuropathology,
and neurophysiology to medical residents, petitioner received certain funds which she documented
on her income tax return as being a fellowship grant. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue found
that the funds received during the tax year at issue to be compensation for valuable services rendered.
The U.S. Tax Court sustained this decision. Id. at 64-66, 73.
99. Id. at 73.
100. Proskey v. Comm’r, 51 T.C. 918 (U.S. Tax Ct. 1969) Petitioner, a licensed physician and
resident at University Hospital in Ann Arbor, Michigan, received yearly monetary stipends during his
medical residency. The amounts received were based upon the number of years of service that
petitioner provided as a resident. In return, petitioner supervised the activities of medical students,
interns, and assistant residents. During the years of his residency, petitioner was not a candidate for a
degree. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue found that the stipend received during the tax year at
issue was compensation for employment services rendered, not a fellowship grant. The U.S. Tax
Court sustained this determination. Id. at 919-22.
101. Zolnay v. Comm’r, 49 T.C. 389, 399 (1968). During that tax period at issue, petitioner
worked solely on the subject of her thesis, which was not an established University research project,
thus fulfilling the Masters Program’s degree requirements. During this period, the facts document that
the University did not treat petitioner as an employee and that the terms of the graduate assistantship
did not require that she do any teaching or research on University projects while receiving funding.
Id. at 394.
102. Id. at 394-95.
103. Id. at 396-97.
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services, noted several considerations, including: (1) petitioner’s fortyhour work weeks; (2) the requisite supervised activities, planned time
schedules, and progress reports; (3) the amount paid to petitioner; (4) the
disconnect between petitioner’s research and his doctoral dissertation; (5)
the fact that petitioner’s application for a graduate fellowship had been
disapproved; and (6) that the university regarded petitioner as an
employee. 104
In contrast to Zolnay, the U.S. Tax Court in Smith v. Comm’r
determined that funds given by a university to a student working as a
graduate assistant while completing her Master’s degree constituted a
scholarship or fellowship grant. 105 In its published opinion, the Tax Court
cited to Bingler and documented several factors used in drawing its
conclusion, including the fact that petitioner worked only on her studies
during the tax period at issue, that the University did not receive a direct
substantial benefit from petitioner’s research, that petitioner did not teach
or conduct research on any University project during the funding period,
and that there was no indication that petitioner was required to publish her
findings in exchange for receiving university funds. 106 Although the
respondent argued that payments made to petitioner were taxable as
income because they were made in exchange for services rendered to the
University, the Tax Court denied this argument, finding no quid pro quo
present. 107
The above case examples articulate the IRS’s treatment of academic
scholarships as non-taxable income where there is no quid pro quo
involved. 108 However, amounts that represent payment in exchange for
teaching, research or other services as a condition for receiving the
scholarship are deemed valuable consideration and therefore taxable as
income. 109 Although the quid pro quo interpretation of Section 117 and
the Treasury Regulations as enunciated in Bingler seems clear, such
application has not necessarily been an operational reality at the collegiate
level, as universities have not yet moved towards treating student-athlete
scholarships as qualified taxable income. 110
104. Id. at 397-99.
105. Smith v. Comm’r, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1348 (1986).
106. Id. at 1350.
107. Id.
108. See Jake Linford, Organ Donation & Human Subjects Research: New Perspectives: The
Kidney Donor Scholarship Act: How College Scholarships Can Provide Financial Incentives for
Kidney Donation While Preserving Altruistic Meaning, 2 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y. 265,
302 (2009).
109. Id.
110. Id.; see also Hoeflich, supra note 80, at 592 (noting that the law is clear that if an
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Numerous scholarly publications have noted a disconnect between
the imposition of Section 117 and Bingler to athletic grants-in-aid. 111
Although the debate is open as to whether student-athletes actually
provide services in exchange for their athletic scholarships, the IRS has
never sought to tax athletic scholarships. 112 Of intrigue to this ongoing
deliberation, on January 21, 2015, two former University of North
Carolina Chapel Hill (UNC) student-athletes—Rashanda McCants and
Devon Ramsay—filed a lawsuit against the school and the NCAA
alleging that they represented hundreds of thousands of student-athletes
nationwide who were promised an education in return for generating
millions of dollars in revenue each year, yet receive an inferior
instruction. 113 The complaint accuses the NCAA of knowingly allowing
educational institution requires services of a student in exchange for a grant or stipend, that student
must include such amount in their gross income).
111. See, e.g., Randall, supra note 88, at 299-309 (analyzing the application of IRC Section 117
and related case law to the current scholarship model in college athletics and ultimately concluding
that athletic scholarships should be taxable under the current language of the Code); Hoeflich, supra
note 80, at 602, 614-17 (scrutinizing the quid pro quo application of Section 117 to athletic
scholarships, and proposing that the IRS tax student-athletes’ scholarship money, or alternatively
suggesting that the NCAA change its rules in order to avoid such treatment); Thomas R. Hurst & J.
Grier Pressly III, Payment of Student-Athletes: Legal & Practical Obstacles, 7 VILL. SPORTS & ENT.
L. J. 55, 74 (2000) (noting that it is “widely recognized” that athletic scholarships do not meet the
exclusionary requirements of IRC Section 117 because student-athletes are required to perform
athletic services in exchange for receipt of their scholarship money); Daniel Nestel, Note: Athletic
scholarships: An Imbalance of Power Between the University and the Student-Athlete, 53 OHIO ST.
L. J. 1401, 1413 (1992) (arguing that athletic scholarships create a quid pro quo relationship between
the university and student-athlete because student-athletes are required to perform services in
exchange for their scholarship money); William B. Gould IV, Glenn M. Wong & Eric Weitz, Full
Court Press: Northwestern University, A New Challenge to the NCAA, 35 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1,
60 (2014) (noting that if the value of an athletic scholarship is deemed a salary, student-athletes may
be taxed on such income based on the holding in Bingler).
112. See, e.g., Hoeflich, supra note 80, at 592 (observing that because the IRS has never sought
to tax athletic scholarships, schools must not require services in exchange for scholarship money;
however, the author further provides that such conundrum indicates otherwise.); see also Nestel,
supra note 111, at 1413 (scrutinizing that the current language of Section 117 creates a quid pro quo
relationship as the student-athlete is required to perform services for the university); Robert
McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student-Athlete: The College Athlete as
Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 86 (2006) (arguing that the NCAA’s insistence on characterizing
student-athletes as amateurs masks the reality that universities employ players to provide athletic
services in exchange for compensation); Linford, supra note 108, at 302 (providing that it is uncertain
why the IRS does not tax athletic scholarships regardless of the fact that it is a bargained-for exchange
between player and university).
113. See McCants v. NCAA, Class Action Complaint, Jury Trial Demand, 15 CVS 1782 (Super.
Ct. NC, Jan. 22, 2015), available at http://www.cbssports.com/images/blogs/Hausfeld-complaint.pdf;
see also Sara Ganim, Lawsuit Claims UNC and NCAA Broke Promises In ‘Spectacular Fashion’,
CNN (last updated Jan. 23, 2015, 7:58 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/22/us/unc-paper-classeslawsuit/index.html (evaluating the lawsuit filed against UNC and the NCAA); Michael McCann &
John Wertheim, Rashanda McCants, Devon Ramsey file suit against UNC, NCAA, SPORTS
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member schools to commit academic fraud in promising educations and
educational opportunities to scholarship student-athletes, and yet failing
to implement adequate monitoring systems to prevent such fraud from
occurring. 114 Specifically, the lawsuit takes aim at “the NCAA and UNC’s
abject failure to safeguard and provide a meaningful education to
[scholarship] athletes who agreed to attend UNC—and take the field—in
exchange for academically sound instruction.” 115 Although this complaint
does not include a tax issue, the key language within the complaint
specifying the verbiage in exchange for could pose another interesting
twist in the future application of IRC Section 117 should taxing athletic
scholarships stimulate the IRS’s interest in the future. 116
Applying Bingler’s quid pro quo analysis to student-athletes is
straightforward—if a university requires that the student-athlete perform
services in exchange for their grant-in-aid, that student may not exclude
the scholarship amount from gross income. 117 An examination of the
degree of control that universities and coaches exert on student-athletes
throughout the course of the calendar year, coupled with the compensation
paid to them in the form of athletic grants-in-aid, and the economic
dependency of student-athletes on their universities suggest that studentathletes are in fact paid-to-play. 118 Further, a review of the court testimony
from the O’Bannon case provides strong evidence that certain studentathletes are required to participate in sports in exchange for their
scholarship earnings. 119 Specifically, during trial, Ed O’Bannon and other
former student-athletes testified that their job at school was to play sports
and that playing college sports was their main occupation due to the

ILLUSTRATED
(last
updated
Jan.
23,
2015),
http://www.si.com/collegebasketball/2015/01/06/rashanda-mccants-unc-paper-classes-lawsuit (analyzing the McCants v. UNC
case).
114. Steve Berkowitz, North Carolina, NCAA Sued for Academic Scandal, USA TODAY (Jan.
22, 2015, 9:50 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2015/01/22/lawsuit-filed-againstnorth-carolina-ncaa-on-academic- scandal/22173755/.
115. Steven Ginsburg, Two ex-North Carolina Athletes File Lawsuit Alleging Academic Fraud,
REUTERS (Jan 22, 2015, 6:12 PM, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/22/us-unc-fraud-lawsuitidUSKBN0KV2RO20150122; see also Jon Solomon, Ex-North Carolina athletes sue NCAA, UNC
SPORTS
(Jan.
22,
2015,
4:20
PM),
over
academic
scandal,
CBS
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jon-solomon/24984287/ex-unc-athletes-sue-ncaaunc-over-academic-scandal (noting that the plaintiffs’ lawyers are seeking an injunctive relief class
defined as “anyone who attended North Carolina on an athletic scholarship, past or present”).
116. E.g., Solomon, supra note 115.
117. See Hoeflich, supra note 80, at 602.
118. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 112, at 97-119 (providing a thorough analysis
of the extent of control that universities have over student-athletes).
119. Id.
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magnitude of time they were required to devote. 120 Finally, the original
NLRB Northwestern decision reinforced the argument that studentathletes receive a substantial economic benefit of scholarship money in
exchange for performing football-related services, under what amounts to
a contract-for-hire. 121
NCAA member institutions hold vast power which allows them to
cancel scholarship benefits. 122 In order to receive full benefits during the
term of the scholarship, recipients must be academically eligible, not
fraudulently misrepresent information on their application, letter of intent,
or financial aid agreement, not engage in serious misconduct warranting
substantial disciplinary penalty, and must continue to participate in the
athletic program. 123 Such broad range of university power further
articulates the possible application of Bingler’s quid pro quo analysis to
student-athletes. 124
Still, as the IRS has not pronounced any specific interest in pursuing
athletic scholarships to date, the complex inquiry into whether college
scholarships are taxable in the future could hinge on whether studentathletes are identified as actual “employees” of the universities they
represent. 125 The option of compensating student-athletes as scholarshipearning employees may be more complicated than merely paying them
monetary compensation or stipends, as such preference presents the
possibility of future legislative changes to the IRC itself or further judicial
interpretation of Section 117 with respect to athletic scholarships. 126
Currently, so long as student-athletes are not required to participate
in any specific sport in exchange for scholarship awards, the language of
the IRC has not been applied to prevent student-athletes from excluding
120. Isaac Brekken, Judge Rules Against NCAA in Ed O’Bannon Case, CBS NEWS (Aug. 8,
2014, 8:19 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/judge-rules-against-ncaa-in-ed-obannon-case/.
121. WithumSmith+Brown, supra note 6.
122. See NCAA Manual 15.3.4.2; see also Nestel, supra note 111, at 1413 (noting that “the
NCAA rules only prevent a university from terminating a student-athlete’s scholarship benefits during
the award term on the basis of injury or athletic ability).
123. See Nestel, supra note 111, at 1413; see also NCAA Manual 15.3.4.2.
124. See Nestel, supra note 11, at 1413; see also Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969).
125. See Hoeflich, supra note 82, at 581; see also Sanserino, supra note 56 (noting the potential
IRS implications which could emerge from the changing nature of the relationship between studentathletes and universities).
126. See Hoeflich, supra note 80, at 592 (noting that the IRS has never sought to tax athletic
scholarships); see also Robert W. Lee, The Taxation of Athletic Scholarships: An Uneasy Tension
between Benevolence and Consistency, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 591, 592 (1985) (documenting that the
IRS has never sought to tax athletic scholarships); Mike Schinner, Touchdowns and Taxes: Are
Athletic Scholarships Merely Disguised Compensation?, 8 AM. J. TAX POL’Y. 127, 139 (1990)
(stating that since enactment of section 117, no court has specifically addressed issue of whether
athletic scholarships constitute taxable income).
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their scholarships from gross income. 127 Thus, under the purview of the
current application of Section 117 and Bingler, student-athletes receiving
qualified scholarships do not pay income taxes on scholarship moneys
received. 128 However, such application could change in the future should
the NLRB revisit the question as to whether or not to characterize studentathletes as employees of their institutions.
Although the IRC does not specifically define the term “services”
with regard to the application of Section 117, the pertinent Treasury
Regulations limit “services” to those “in the nature of part-time
employment required as a condition to receiving the scholarship.” 129
Based on the previous examination and application of Section 117,
evaluating whether student-athletes’ grant-in-aid money could be taxable
in the future may pivot on whether student-athletes are deemed to receive
some or all of their scholarship money in exchange for services required
as a condition for receiving their scholarship money as employees of their
institutions. 130 To appreciate the potential impact of characterizing
student-athletes as employees of their institutions from a federal income
tax perspective, an understanding and application of the employeremployee relationship is critical.
IV. THE STUDENT-ATHLETE AS EMPLOYEE—THE FEDERAL INCOME
TAX PERSPECTIVE
As previously analyzed, the IRC allows that a taxpayer’s gross
income not include amounts received as qualified scholarships by
individuals who are degree candidates at educational institutions. 131
However, as also noted, qualified scholarship awards are limiting in that
if an educational institution requires services of a student “in exchange”
for a monetary grant, then the student cannot exclude scholarship amounts
received from their gross income. 132 While the IRC does not specifically

127. Potuto et al., supra note 4, at 890 n.40 (referencing commentary within footnote 40 with
regard to the exclusion of qualified scholarships from the parameters of IRC §117(c)).
128. IRC § 117(c)(1) (LEXIS 2015) (stating that the exclusion for qualified scholarships does
not apply to amounts received which represent “payment for teaching, research, or other services by
the student required as a condition for receiving the qualified scholarship . . .”).
129. See Treas. Reg. § 1.117-2(a)(1) (LEXIS through the Nov. 4, 2015 issue of the Fed.
Register).
130. See id.; see also NLRB v. Northwestern, 2014 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 221, 2014-15 NLRB Dec.
(CCH) ¶ 15,781 (2014).
131. IRC §117(a) (LEXIS 2015).
132. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (LEXIS, through Nov. 4, 2015 issue of the Fed.
Register); see also, Hoeflich, supra note 80, at 592; Hurst & Pressly, supra note 111, at 74
(documenting that although IRC § 117 does not exclude portions of athletic scholarships constituting
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define the term “services,” Treasury Regulation 1.117-2 limits services to
those “in the nature of part-time employment required as a condition to
receiving the scholarship.” 133 Although athletic scholarships are not
currently taxable to the student-athlete, if players are deemed
“employees” of their institutions, it is feasible that the IRS may eventually
reevaluate whether student-athletes are receiving part or all of their
scholarship money in exchange for services rendered. 134
The employee characterization of scholarship athletes indicating a
shift from the amateur/ education model to the commercial/education
model could increase the likelihood that athletic scholarships will be
taxable as gross income. 135 Specifically, if any portion of an athletic
scholarship is found to be granted in exchange for services provided to
their institution, such portion would constitute taxable income to the
student-athlete. 136 The original NLRB 2014 Northwestern decision
supported the notion that student-athletes receive a substantial economic
benefit of scholarship money in exchange for performing football-related
services, under what amounts to a contract-for-hire. 137 A contract-for-hire
“binds an employer to pay compensation to an employee who performs
services, sets forth the place to perform such services and the work to be
performed, and sets the compensation for the performance of such
work.” 138 In the event a contract-for-hire exists, the question is whether
such contract creates an employer-employee relationship. 139
To thoroughly analyze whether an employer-employee relationship
exists between student-athletes and their universities, Subsection IV.A
explores the various tests used to determine whether a scholarship falls
room and board from gross income, few student-athletes report room and board as income, and the
IRS has not pursued the issue); Schinner, supra note 126, at 146-48, 155 (noting that room, board, or
incidental expenses must be included in a recipient’s gross income); Lee, supra note 126, at 595
(stating that IRC § 117(c) applies to scholarship athletes because they must be degree candidates).
133. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-2(a)(1) (LEXIS through the Nov. 4, 2015 issue of the Fed. Register).
134. See infra notes 174-210 and accompanying text.
135. Timothy Davis, Intercollegiate Athletics: Competing Models and Conflicting Realities, 25
RUTGERS L.J. 269, 323 (1994) (providing that “under the amateur/education model, the studentathlete is viewed as an amateur, and college athletics is considered an integral part of the education
purpose of universities.” Id. at 273. Under the commercial/education model, education still remains a
component; however, a predominant characteristic is that college athletics is a commodity capitalizing
on “the potential benefits of a successful athletic program.”). Id. at 279-80.
136. See IRC § 117(c)(1) (LEXIS 2015); see also C. Peter Goplerud III, Symposium: Sports
Law As A Reflection Of Society’s Laws And Values: Pay for Play For College Athletes: Now, More
Than Ever, S. TEX. L. REV. 1081, 1102 (1997).
137. WithumSmith+Brown, supra note 6.
138. Davis, supra note 135, at 283; see also Ray Yasser, Are Scholarship Athletes at Big-Time
Programs Really University Employees?—You Bet They Are!, 9 THE BLACK L.J. 65, 65 (1984).
139. Davis, supra note 135, at 284.
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within taxable income. First Subsection IV.A.1 reveals that the IRS
twenty-factor test and some state workers’ compensation cases support
construction of the student-athlete as an employee. Subsection IV.A.2
concludes that the economic realities test used under FLSA and by some
states for workers’ compensation supports finding student-athletes as
employees. Additionally, Subsection IV.A.3 addresses a hybrid test for
federal discrimination supporting the treatment of student-athletes as
employees. Finally, Subsection IV.B includes commentators who support
defining student-athletes as employees for various reasons.
A. Examining the Employer-Employee Relationship
Whether an individual is covered by a particular employment, labor,
or tax law hinges on the definition of “employee.” 140 Because no set
standard at the federal or state level affords a legislative definition of the
term employee, various tests have been occupied to help decipher the
appropriate characterization of such a worker.141 The depiction of an
individual as an employee generally requires an analysis under one of the
various commonly utilized tests, including: (1) the common law test
(embraced by the IRS), (2) the economic realities test, and (3) the hybrid
test. 142
1. The Common Law/IRS Twenty-Factor Test
The common law test was developed under the traditional legal basis
of agency law, which requires that within an employment context one
person (the employee) acts for or represents another (the employer) by the

140. Susan N. Housman, Who Is an Employee? Determining Independent Contractor Status,
DEP’T.
OF
LABOR
(Aug.
1999),
http://www.dol.gov/dol/aboutdol/history/
U.S.
herman/reports/futurework/conference/staffing/9.1_contractors.htm.
141. See id.
142. See Charles J. Muhl, What is an Employee? The Answer Depends on the Federal Law,
MONTHLY LABOR REV. 1, 5-6 (Jan. 2002), http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2002/01/art1full.pdf; see
also Karen R. Harned, Georgine M. Kryda & Elizabeth A. Milito, Creating A Workable Legal
Standard for Defining an Independent Contractor, 4 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 93, 99-100
(2010) (noting that state and local governments have used several different tests to address the
question of employer/employee relationship, to include the common law approaches, the IRS
approach, and the ABC Test (a third test used by some states in determining whether workers are
classified as employees or independent contractors for state unemployment tax purposes)); YOUR
DICTIONARY, ABC test–Legal Definition, http://www.yourdictionary.com/abc-test (last visited Feb.
24, 2015) (The ABC test asks: (1) does the individual work independently of the employer’s control
(A = Alone), (2) does the individual maintain his own place of business (B = Business), and (3) Does
the individual work at an established trade and exercise control over his own schedule and work
environment (C = Control)).
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employer’s authority. 143 Under the common law test, courts have
evaluated both contractual intent and the right to control to analyze
whether an employer-employee relationship exists. 144
In conjunction with the idea of contractual intent, courts have noted
that there must be a showing of “intent to enter into an employeeemployer relationship at the time the parties entered into the
agreement.” 145 Specifically, there must be an indication of a shared
understanding that an employer-employee relationship exists. 146 In
evaluating the right to control, an examination of whether the employer
possesses “the right to control the manner, means, and details of the
worker’s performance” is required. 147 Factors influencing this analysis
include “contractual provisions, the exercise of control, the method of
payment, the furnishing of equipment, and the right to terminate the
employee.” 148 Although the common law test involves an evaluation of
ten individual factors to determine whether a person is an employee, with
no one single factor being dispositive, the IRS uses a derivative of this
test, taking into account some of the common law test factors as part of its
own twenty-factor test. 149

143. Muhl, supra note 142, at 3 (citing to BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, p. 62); Id. at 5.
144. Justin C. Vine, Note: Leveling the Playing Field: Student Athletes Are Employees of their
University, 12 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y. & ETHICS J. 235, 246-47 (2013); see also Rensing v. Indiana
State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1173 (Ind. 1983) (involving a collegiate football player
who suffered a debilitating injury resulting in his claim for recovery under workmen’s compensation;
the court noted, “It is clear that while a determination of the existence of an employee-employer
relationship is a complex matter involving many factors, the primary consideration is that there was
an intent that a contract of employment, either express or implied, did exist.”); see also E.E.O.C. v.
Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F. 3d 696, 705 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that “[t]he most important
factor in deciding whether a worker was an employee or an independent contractor was the employer’s
right to control the worker’s work” while also employing an economic realities test).
145. Vine, supra note 144, at 248; see also Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 444
N.E.2d 1170, 1173 (Ind. 1983).
146. Vine, supra note 144, at 248.
147. Davis, supra note 135, at 286; see also Cmty. For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S.
730, 751-52 (1989).
148. Davis, supra note 135, at 286; see also ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN’S
COMPENSATION, § 44.31, at 8-89 (1990).
149. See Muhl, supra note 142, at 5, 7 (offering that the ten factors analyzed under the common
law test are: right to control, type of business, supervision, skill level, tools and materials, continuing
relationship, method of payment, integration, intent, and employment by more than one firm); see
also Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296 (codified at Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(d)-1 (LEXIS through Oct.
28, 2015 issue of the Fed. Register)); Marilyn Barrett, Independent Contractor/Employee
Classification in the Entertainment Industry: The Old, the New and the Continuing Uncertainty, 13
U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 91, 96-98 (1995, 1996) (expanding on the IRS’s twenty-factor test
when differentiating between employees and independent contractors:
1. Instructions or Degree of Control. An employer generally exercises a far greater degree
of supervision and control over the details of the work being done by employees than by
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The IRS twenty-factor test on employment status (IRS test) is not a
test per se but an analytical tool employed to arrive at a determination of
the control test. 150 Similar to the common law test, no single factor within
the IRS test is weighted heavier than another, and there is no minimum

independent contractors.
2. Furnishing of Training. An employer generally does not provide training to independent
contractors.
3. Integration. An independent contractor generally engages in projects that are not a part
of the day-to-day operations of the company.
4. Services Rendered Personally; Right to Delegate Work. An employee is generally required to render the requested services personally.
5. Right to Hire, Supervise, Pay and Fire Assistants. An independent contractor provides
the labor necessary to accomplish the purpose of the contract and has the right to hire,
supervise, pay and fire assistants. In contrast, if the person for whom the services are performed has these rights, an employee relationship is indicated.
6. Continuing Relationship. An independent contractor is generally hired for a specified
time period whereas an employee is generally hired for an indefinite period of time.
7. Control Over Hours of Work. The employer’s right to set the hours worked indicates
employee status.
8. Independent Trade; Full Time Work. Where a worker must work full time for the employer for whom services are provided, such person has greater control over the worker’s
work.
9. Place of Work. Working on the employer’s premises indicates employer control and
employee status.
10. Sequence of Work. An employer does not direct an independent contractor as to the
sequence in which the work should be performed, only the outcome of the work to be.
11. Reports Required. An independent contractor is generally not required to submit regular
reports or attend regular meetings.
12. Payment by Hour, Week, or Month. An independent contractor is generally paid by the job
whereas an employee is generally paid by the hour, week or month.
13. Payment of Business and/or Travel Expenses. A worker whose business and/or traveling
expenses is reimbursed by the person for whom services are performed is ordinarily an
employee.
14. Furnishing of Tools. An employee is provided tools by the employer.
15. Investment in Facilities. Lack of an investment in facilities indicates dependence upon the
person for whom services are provided and employee status.
16. Profit and Loss. An employee generally does not bear a real economic risk.
17. Working for More than One Firm. An independent contractor frequently works for many
firms simultaneously.
18. Making Work Available to the General Public. A worker who makes his services available
to the general public on a regular and consistent basis is generally an independent contractor.
19. Right to Discharge. An employer may terminate an employee at will, absent a written
employment contract and subject to limitations under applicable labor and tort laws.
20. Right to Terminate. If a worker has the right to terminate the relationship at any time
without incurring liability, an employee relationship is indicated.).
150. Judson D. Stelter, Note, The IRS’ Classification Settlement Program: Is It an Adequate
Tool to Relieve Taxpayer Burden for Small Businesses that Have Misclassified Workers As
Independent Contractors?, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 451, 457-58 (2008) (citing Jack E. Karns, Current
Federal and State Conflicts in the Independent Contractor Versus Employee Classification
Controversy, 22 CAMPBELL L. REV. 105, 108 (1999)).
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number of factors necessary to conclude that an employer-employee
relationship exists. 151 The factors analyzed as part of this test are
categorized into three groups—behavioral control, financial control, and
type of relationship—and include training, integration of workers’
services into business operations, services rendered personally,
continuing relationship, set hours of work, working on the employer’s
premises, right to discharge, and right to terminate. 152 Although the IRS
test is commonly used to help characterize a worker as an employee, it is
met with some skepticism in academic literature for its inefficiency and
subjectivity in distinguishing between employees and independent
contractors. 153
Still, the common law/IRS test has been applied to issues associated
with the NLRA, which governs labor-management relations and
collective bargaining for unionized employers. 154 Further, in Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 155 the U.S. Supreme Court cited
favorably to the IRS’s test, ruling that for Federal laws not containing a
clear definition of the term employee, the relationship between an
employer-employee should be evaluated on the basis of the common law
test, focusing specifically on who has the right to control the worker. 156
Summarily, under the common law test, an individual whose work process
and product are found to be controlled by the employer will be deemed an
employee. 157
From a federal income tax perspective, the IRS specified in Revenue
151. See Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 CB 296.; see also Alexandre Zucco, Note, Independent
Contractors and the Internal Revenue Service’s “Twenty Factor” Test: Perspective on the Problems
of Today and the Solutions for Tomorrow, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 599, 601 (2011).
152. See Harned, et al., supra note 142, at 103; see also Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 CB 296 for a
full list of all twenty applicable test factors.
153. See Zucco, supra note 151, at 609 (arguing that the IRS’s twenty factors were established
to represent a multitude of competing considerations that are not easily classifiable, that the three
categories create only arbitrary groups without specific clarification as to any of the individual factors,
and that courts have interpreted these twenty factors in various and unexpected ways, further adding
to the layer of inconsistency); see also Harned et al., supra note 142, at 103 (analyzing certain negative
issues arising from the IRS twenty-factor test, to include burdensome compliance obligations, the
subjectivity in interpreting the various factors, and the applicability limitations of this test to federal
employment taxes and income tax withholding); Christopher Buscaglia, Crafting a Legislative
Solution to the Economic Harm of Employee Misclassification, 9 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 111, 113
(2009) (proposing that the IRS twenty-factor test is insufficient “to deal with the range of evils”
arising from the misclassification of workers).
154. Muhl, supra note 142, at 5.
155. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992).
156. Id.; see also Susan Schwochau, Note: Identifying an Independent Contractor For Tax
Purposes: Can Clarity and Fairness Be Achieved?, 84 IOWA L. REV. 163, 181 n. 112 (1998) (noting
the Darden Court’s favorable application of the IRS’s twenty-factor test).
157. Muhl, supra note 142, at 6.
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Ruling 87-41 that “an individual is an employee for federal employment
tax purposes if the individual has the status of an employee under the usual
common law rules applicable in determining the employer- employee
relationship.” 158 Although some courts have moved away from express
reliance on the IRS test, it is noteworthy that Revenue Ruling 87-41 is still
the current law and reflects the IRS’s classification of employment status
from an income tax perspective. 159
Although the IRS has itself acknowledged that additional factors
may be important in classifying the employment relationship, its potential
reliance on the twenty-factor test in the future with regards to studentathletes cannot be discounted. 160 Employing the application of the twentyfactor test in Darden, the relationship between student-athletes and the
university they play for must focus specifically on who has the right to
control. 161 The original NLRB ruling relied on the premise that
Northwestern University scholarship football players were employees and
were entitled to form a union based on certain factors, which included the
extent of time dedicated to their sport, the amount of control exerted by
coaches, and the scholarship agreements which paralleled contracts for
compensation. 162 Analyzing the right of control that universities have over
student-athletes has been heavily scrutinized in academic literature,
offering a composite sketch of the magnitude of daily, pervasive control
imposed by athletic departments and coaches on student-athletes. 163
Analyzing the enormous control that universities have over some student158. Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296.
159. Robert Wood, Independent Contractor vs. Employee and Blackwater, 70 MONT. L. REV.
95, 106 (2009); see also Avis Rent-a-Car Sys., Inc. v. United States, 503 F. 2d 423, 428-29 (2d Cir.
1994); Leb’s Enter. Inc. v. United States, 2000 WL 139551, 5-6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 2000).
160. See Wood, supra note 159, at 106 (citing to IRS Employment Tax Handbook, I.R.S. Pub.
No. 104, at § 5.81 (2007); Independent Contractor or Employee?, I.R.S. Pub. Training Materials No.
3320-102, TPDS 842381 (Oct. 30, 2996)).
161. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992).
162. Strauss & Elder, supra note 1.
163. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 112 at 97-119 (examining the degree of control
over student-athletes by their universities, including the excessive and mandatory daily practice
schedules, conditioning, weightlifting sessions, study halls, game day activities, and required travel
schedules during the pre-, regular, and post seasons); see also Vine, supra note 144, at 251 (2013)
(presenting that University athletic departments exercise an enormous amount of control over
scholarship athletes, including attendance at mandatory practices, games, film sessions, and study
hall); Nicholas Fram and T. Ward Frampton, A Union of Amateurs: A Legal Blueprint to Reshape
Big-Time College Athletics, 60 BUFFALO L. REV. 1003, 1032 (2012) (documenting that studentathletes’ labor and lives are subject to the control of their universities, both on and off the field to an
extent that most other employees would consider intolerable); Steven L. Willborn, College Athletes
as Employees: An Overflowing Quiver, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 65, 102 (2014) (documenting that
college athletes are subject to highly detailed control by their universities over how they perform their
services).
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athletes suggests an employee-employer relationship exists under the
common law/IRS Twenty-Factor Test. 164
One potential outlier that could be considered should the IRS
reevaluate the tax status of student-athletes’ scholarship money in the
future is the 1983 case, Rensing v. Indiana State University Board of
Trustees. 165 This case addressed the question of whether an injured
student-athlete qualified as a university employee for purposes of
workers’ compensation benefits. 166 In vacating the Indiana Court of
Appeals decision in favor of Rensing as an employee under the Indiana
statute, the state Supreme Court denied the student-athlete any benefits,
finding no evidence of an employer-employee relationship. 167
Although this case primarily addressed a workers’ compensation
issue, the Indiana Supreme Court focused in part on the scholarship offer
itself, finding that Rensing’s acceptance of the scholarship did not elevate
to the level of an employment contract as neither party considered the
scholarship to be either pay or income. 168 Particularly, the court stated that
neither “the University, the NCAA, the IRS [or] Rensing, himself”
considered the scholarship benefits to be income. 169 The court further
documented that “Rensing did not consider the [scholarship] benefits as
income as he did not report them for income tax purposes.” 170
The Indiana Supreme Court concluded that the IRS does not
distinguish between athletic and academic scholarships and that
scholarship recipients are not taxed on their scholarship proceeds.171 In
essence, if the scholarship proceeds were not considered reportable to the
IRS, the Court did not consider it income. 172 However, as the reasoning
behind the Rensing analysis was specific to the qualification of workers’
compensation benefits, such rationale would not suffice in situations
where student-athletes are specifically defined as employees by their
institution. 173 The Rensing court focused on the amateur nature of college
164. NLRB v. Northwestern, 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221; Muhl, supra note 142, at 5.
165. Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983).
166. Rensing, 444 N.E.2d at 1170-71.
167. IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-1-1 et seq. (Burns, through the 2015 First Regular Session of the
119th General Assembly, P.L. 1-2591974); see also Rensing, 444 N.E.2d at 1171, 1175.
168. Stephen L. Ukeiley, No Salary, No Union, No Collective Bargaining: Scholarship Athletes
Are An Employer’s Dream Come True, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 167, 188 (1996); see also Rensing,
at 1174.
169. Rensing, 444 N.E.2d at 1174.
170. Id. at 1173.
171. Id. See also Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-31 I.R.B.
172. Ukeiley, supra note 168, at 188.
173. See Goplerud, supra note 136, at 1099 (opining, similarly, that the Rensing analysis would
not be available to a court reviewing the issue of whether a stipend paid to student-athletes would
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sports in conjunction with the NCAA’s prohibition on paying studentathletes. 174 If universities were to officially label select student-athletes as
employees and subsequently offer scholarships or stipends to cover their
tuition, fees, room, board, and books in exchange for participating on the
sports field, such payments would begin to look more like a professional
sports contractual relationship. 175
As the Rensing Court focused on the amateurism perspective of
college athletics in concluding that an employment contractual agreement
did not create a contract-for-hire, it would not likely be heavily relied upon
in determining whether student-athletes’ scholarship funds are taxable
should they be officially deemed employees of their institutions in the
future. 176 However, the decision is intriguing for its demonstration of how
the perception of amateurism in college athletics sways the legal
determination of the relationship between student-athletes to their
universities. 177
2. The Economic Realities Test
An alternative test used to characterize a worker as an employee is
the economic realities test. This test, which is generally applied in the
context of the FLSA governing minimum-wage and overtime obligations,
specifically targets the economic relationship between the worker and the
employer. 178 Specifically, an individual is defined as an employee if they
are economically dependent on the employer for continued employment,
regardless of how the employer chooses to label them. 179 This test is
generally satisfied “where a worker performs tasks integral to the
employer’s regular business, and does not provide an independent
business or service vis-à-vis the employer.” 180
Under the purview of the economic realities test, the nature of the
relationship between worker and employer is examined “in light of the
fact that independent contractors would typically not rely on a sole
constitute a wage paid for services as a stipend provision within scholarships would likely fall within
the existing definition of “employee”).
174. Id., citing Rensing, 444 N.E.2d at 1173.
175. Id.
176. See Davis, supra note 135, at 290-91.
177. Id. at 293 (documenting the significance of the Rensing, Coleman, Van Horn, and Nemeth
court decisions within the legal analyses of relationships between athletes and their universities).
178. Muhl, supra note 142, at 6-9.
179. Id.; see also Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond “Economic Realities”: The
Case for Amending Federal Employment Discrimination Laws to Include Independent Contractors,
38 B.C. L. REV. 239, 240 (1997).
180. Davis, supra note 135, at 287 (citing LARSON, supra note 150, at § 45.00, at 8-193).
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employer for continued employment at any one time, but would work for,
and be compensated by, many different employers, whereas most
employees hold a single job and rely on that one employer for continued
employment and for their primary source of income.” 181 It is the easiest
test for a plaintiff to satisfy in construing a person as an employee because
of its broad application of the term employee. 182 Factors used to determine
a worker’s status under the economic realities test are: (1) whether the
worker’s services are integral to the employer’s business, (2) the worker’s
investment in the facilities and equipment, (3) the management’s right to
control, (4) the worker’s opportunity for profit or loss, (5) the skill and
initiative required in performing the job, and (6) the permanency of the
relationship. 183
Although there are similarities between the economic realities test
and common law test, the economic realities test ultimately focuses on
whether the economic reality is that a worker “depends on someone else’s
business” for continued employment. 184 Specifically, the function of this
test aims to analyze the dependent nature of the worker to determine
whether the worker can operate without the employer. 185 If an individual
“operates an independent business basis, the worker is classified as an
independent contractor under the economic realities test.” 186
The economic realities test was utilized by a Michigan state court
when analyzing the existence of any employer-employee relationship
between a university and scholarship athlete in Coleman v. Western
Michigan University. 187 However, the test was applied to ascertain
whether a scholarship athlete was entitled to workers’ compensation
following a debilitating injury, which barred him from playing football. 188
At no juncture during its review of this case did the Michigan Court of
Appeals reference the application of the economic realities test (or any
other test) to the taxability of the injured player’s scholarship money. 189
Specifically, the court applied the economic realities test solely to inquire
into the existence of an employment contract between the university and

181. Muhl, supra note 142, at 7.
182. Nicola Kean, The Unprotected Workforce: Why Title VII Must Apply to Workfare
Participants, 9 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 159, 189 (2004).
183. Muhl, supra note 142, at 8.
184. Id. at 9; see also Margot Rutman, Symposium: Exotic Dancers’ Employment Law
Regulations, 8 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 515, 538-39 (1999).
185. Rutman, supra note 184, at 539.
186. Muhl, supra note 142, at 9.
187. See, e.g., Coleman v. Western Michigan Univ., 336 N.W.2d 224 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
188. Id.
189. See Coleman, 336 N.W.2d 224.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol49/iss4/1

32

Kisska-Schulze and Epstein: Taxing Qualified Scholarships
1 - KISSKA-SCHULTZE MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

TAXING QUALIFIED SCHOLARSHIPS

8/11/2016 12:34 PM

803

the student-athlete. 190
Similarly, in the 1984 case Cheatham v. Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Board, a California court held that student-athletes are not
employees of their universities, noting an “absence of any fair inference
of economic benefit” to the university from its wrestling program. 191 In
this case, a scholarship recipient student-athlete was injured during a
wrestling scrimmage and subsequently sought to recoup workers’
compensation. 192 Comparable to the Coleman decision, the Cheatham
court opined only on the question of whether petitioner was an employee
within the meaning of the California labor standards, not tax law. 193
Because the IRS utilizes its own twenty-factor test to determine
whether a worker is an employee under common law principles from a
federal income tax perspective, and as the economic realities test has been
relied on in analyzing employment characterization specifically from a
labor standards viewpoint, the economic realities test would not likely be
the tool utilized exclusively to analyze the taxability of student-athletes’
scholarship money in the future. 194 However, student-athlete scholarship
funds would arguably qualify as taxable income under the economic
realities test.
3. The Hybrid Test
Although a middle ground test that combines elements of both the
common law and economic realities test, the hybrid test was adopted
specifically for the purpose of determining employee status under federal
discrimination statutes. The hybrid test is a combination of elements of
the common law and economic realities tests. 195 The economic realities of
the working relationship is a crucial factor under the hybrid test, but the
employer’s right to control the work process is the determinative factor. 196
While the NLRA has generally applied the common law right to
control test when scrutinizing the employment classification of a worker,
courts resolving cases involving the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) tend to apply the economic realities test, while the wider judicial
trend is to apply the hybrid test to cases involving Title VII of the Civil
190. Id. at 225; see also Craig D. Alfred, Comment: The Illusion of Amateurism: A Climate of
Tortious Interference in the World of Amateur Sports, 86 TUL. L. REV. 465, 483 (2011).
191. Cheatham v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, 49 Cal. Comp. Cases 54, 61 (1984).
192. Id. at 54.
193. Id.
194. See Zucco, supra note 151, at 601.
195. Muhl, supra note 142, at 9.
196. Id.
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Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA). 197 However, many courts have also rejected the adoption of the
hybrid test in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in Darden,
indicating that the common law standard was the appropriate test to use
where a statute fails to specifically define the term employee. 198
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Darden focused only on
defining an “employee” under ERISA, allowing federal and state courts
to continue to apply the hybrid test in other areas of the law. 199 The
combined common law/economic realities test components considered in
applying the hybrid test include supervision, skill level, method of
payment, supplier of tools and materials, duration of employment
relationship, and integration of work into the employer’s business. 200
Other factors further examined under this test include the manner in which
the work relationship is terminated, whether annual leave and/or
retirement benefits are provided, and whether the employer paid Social
Security taxes for the worker. 201
Although a middle ground test that combines elements of both the
common law and economic realities test, the hybrid test was adopted
specifically for the purpose of determining employee status under federal
discrimination statutes.202 Although federal and state courts have applied
the hybrid test, the application of this test in evaluating the employment
status of a student-athlete from a federal income tax perspective is not
likely given both the Darden holding as well as the overriding reality that
the IRS could choose to apply its own twenty-factor test. 203
Following an analysis of the various tests that may be reviewed in
determining whether workers are defined as employees from a federal tax
perspective, the next query is specifically analyzing how paid studentathletes would be characterized for federal income tax purposes. As the
proper characterization of paid student-athletes is imperative to
197. Cliff E. Spencer, Comment, Oregon’s Independent Contractor Statute: A Legislative
Placebo for Employers, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 647, 673 (1995).
198. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318; see also Mitchell H. Rubinstein,
Employees, Employers, and Quasi-Employers: An Analysis of Employees and Employers Who
Operate in the Borderland Between an Employer-And-Employee Relationship, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
605, 627 (2012) (referencing Deal v. State Farm Mut. Ins., 5 F.3d 117, 118-19 (5th Cir. 1993),
Magallanes v. Penske Logistics LLC, 570 F. Supp. 2d 907, 912 (W.D. Tex. 2008), Hopkins v.
Cornerstone Am, 545 F.3d 338, 347 (5th Cir. 2008)).
199. Rubinstein, supra note 198, at 627.
200. Id.
201. Muhl, supra note 142, at 10; see also Diggs v. Harris Hospital-Methodist, Inc., 847 F.2d
270, 272-73 (9th Cir. 1988).
202. Harned, et.al., supra note 142, at 101.
203. Id.; see also Darden, 503 U.S. 318.
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understanding the overall federal tax implications, which certain college
athletes could face in the future, the following analysis ensues.
B. Characterizing Student-Athletes as Employees for Federal Income
Tax Purposes
The proper characterization of a worker as an employee or
independent contractor within a working, business relationship is vitally
important to both the employers and workers in terms of their mutual
obligations and protection under federal law. 204 When employment status
is blurred, employment rights and obligations are likewise uncertain. 205
Uncertainty breeds litigation. 206 Although such classification depends on
the application of federal law, the overriding factor in every test analyzed
previously is who has the right to control the work process, not the label
affixed by the employer. 207
Recent literature querying whether student-athletes should be
characterized as employees under the right to control test suggests there
is a sufficient basis to demonstrate that an employer- employee
relationship already exists. 208 Specifically, scholars have critically
explored the question of whether student-athletes are exploited by the
universities they play for and have challenged that student-athletes are in
fact employees given that academics has taken a back seat to the true
purpose of university agendas—to increase revenue and furnish to their
programs greater exposure. 209
204. Muhl, supra note 142, at 10.
205. See Rubinstein, supra note 198, at 609.
206. Id.
207. See Muhl, supra note 142, at 10.
208. See Vine, supra note 144, at 266 (providing a comprehensive discussion and analysis of
major NCAA-related decisions involving the issue of whether student-athletes should be
characterized as student-athletes, analyzing the tests used by the IRS and courts to determine the
nature of an employment relationship, and concluding that, “NCAA scholarship athletes are
employees of their respective university. They are employees under common law. They are
employees under federal law. Now, more than ever, it is time to put an end to the idea that recipients
of an athletic scholarship are not employees of the university. Equity demands Courts to deem
scholarship athletes employees.”); see also Jason Gurdus, Protection Off of the Playing Field: Student
Athletes Should be Considered University Employees for Purposes of Workers’ Compensation, 29
HOFSTRA L. REV. 907, 909-12 (2001) (applying the various control tests to conclude that studentathletes are arguably employees of the institutions they play for); McCormick & McCormick, supra
note 112, at 82, 130-55 (asserting that the relationship between a university and student-athletes
primarily commercial, not academic, in nature and that an objective judiciary must recognize the
employee status of student-athletes).
209. Vine supra note 144, at 266 (“allowing their academics to play second fiddle”); see also
Gurdus, supra note 208, at 929 (stating that student-athletes are employees of their university and
“[t]he amount of proof available to show that an employment relationship exists between student
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In evaluating the characterization of student-athletes as unpaid
amateurs versus professional employees, the argument can be made that
college sports have not been strictly amateur for countless years, if ever. 210
Specifically, a literary analysis of the extent of control exerted by coaches
over Division I-A football players both on and off the field, during the
athletic season and extending into the remainder of the academic year,
concluded that the common law right to control test is already being
met. 211
Drawing on data derived from personal interviews with Division IA football players, research establishes that coaches exert an inordinate
amount of control over college football players not only during the regular
season, but extending into the off-season as well. 212 Collegiate coaches
control student-athletes’ playing time, competitive eligibility, and access
to training resources. 213 Arguably, student-athletes are subject to greater
control by their universities than are any other employees or group of
employees already being financially compensated for working at such
institutions. 214
The concept that student-athletes should remain unpaid amateurs has
been further criticized as universities’ outward control over their studentathletes has increased in the media.215 Particularly, an examination of the
degree of control that universities have over student-athletes’ names,
images, and likenesses has in recent years transformed from literary

athletes and colleges is substantial”).
210. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 112, at 75.
211. Id. at 98. Today, the NCAA refers to Division I-A football as the Football Bowl
Subdivision (FBS) whereas Division I-AA is the Football Championship Subdivision (FCS).
212. Id. at 98-105 (noting that coaches’ exercise of control of Division I-A athletes is apparent
in the form of location, duration, and manner in which athletes participate in required practices,
games, and academic commitments during the regular season, as well as the control which coaches
have over players’ lives in the off-season to include training, conditioning, team meetings, mandatory
study halls, summertime weightlifting and running, and mandatory pre-season practices beginning in
early August which encompasses the most intensive training period of the year. Other demands on
student-athletes include attendance at post-season bowl games, recruitment pressures and mandatory
random drug testing.).
213. Susan L. Smith & Miriam Schuchman, Sickle Cell Screening of College Athletes: Legal
Obligations Fulfilled, Moral Obligations Lacking, 92 OR. L. REV. 1127, 1141 (2014).
214. McCormick & McCormick, supra note 112, at 97.
215. See W. Burlette Carter, Responding to the Perversion of In Loco Parentis: Using a
Nonprofit Organization to Support Student-Athletes, 35 IND. L. REV. 851, 923 (2001) (stating, “It is
possible to argue that, in the name of keeping intercollegiate athletics an integral part of education,
institutions should be permitted to exercise broader controls over student-athletes than over nonathletes. Evidence suggests that without some controls intercollegiate athletics can get out of hand.”).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol49/iss4/1

36

Kisska-Schulze and Epstein: Taxing Qualified Scholarships
1 - KISSKA-SCHULTZE MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

TAXING QUALIFIED SCHOLARSHIPS

8/11/2016 12:34 PM

807

discussion 216 to judicial litigation involving the NCAA. 217 As previously
discussed, legal attacks against the NCAA have recently pivoted on
whether student-athletes’ likenesses are unlawfully being used in
commercial video games and, therefore, whether certain student-athletes
should be compensated. 218 Such scrutiny surrounding the classification of
the relationships among student-athletes, the institutions they play for, and
the NCAA is indicative of the continued momentum to characterize
student-athletes as employees under the law. 219
During his trial against the NCAA, Ed O’Bannon specifically
testified that his role at UCLA was to play basketball and that making it
to class was difficult due to the amount of time he spent training. 220
O’Bannon stated, “I was an athlete masquerading as a student . . . . I was
there strictly to play basketball.” 221 Others who testified at the O’Bannon
trial stated that they viewed playing sports in college as their occupation,
noting that it is difficult, or even impossible, for student-athletes to
function like normal students due to the amount of time they are required
to devote to their sport. 222
Student-athletes, in return for universities’ promises of free higher
education, the opportunity to earn a seat in the spotlight, and the potential
216. See, e.g., Kristal S. Stippich & Kadence A. Otto, Carrying a Good Joke Too Far? An
Analysis of the Enforceability of Student-Athlete Consent to Use of Name & Likeness, 20 J. LEGAL
ASPECTS OF SPORT 151, 180 (2010) (discussing the Ed O’Bannon lawsuit in light of name, image and
likeness litigation and offering that “the definition of “amateur” will ultimately need to be resolved.”);
see also Spencer H. Larche, Pink-Shirting: Should the NCAA Consider a Maternity and Paternity
Waiver?, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 393, 401-02 (2008) (presenting both sides of the argument over
whether student-athletes should be employees and noting that courts generally have not regarded
student-athletes as employees and offering that educational institutions do not have “significant right
of control” over their activities and cannot fire them, per se. Larche also offers that some individuals
believe otherwise and that athletics departments do, in fact, exercise a significant degree of control
over their time on campus including, “what classes to take, when to study, and when and what to eat,
in addition to the traditionally known demands placed upon student-athletes by practice schedules
and games.”).
217. See Lee Romney, Judge Rules against NCAA in Ed O’Bannon Antitrust Lawsuit, LA TIMES
(Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-ncaa-obannon-ruling-20140808story.html (discussing the decision by U.S. District Court Judge Claudia Wilken, which held that the
NCAA’s policies that prohibit student-athletes from profiting from their own names, images, and
likenesses “unreasonably restrain trade”).
218. See Wolohan, supra note 32.
219. Id.; see also Chris Dufresne, Ed O’Bannon Ruling is not the Real Game-changer for the
NCAA, LA TIMES (Aug. 11, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/sports/sportsnow/la-sp-sn-ncaa-gamechanger-2014081-story.html (quoting Southeastern Conference Commissioner Mike Slive who states
that colleges are “going through a historic evolution” in light of the O’Bannon decision).
220. Isaac Brekken, Judge Rules Against NCAA in Ed O’Bannon Case, CBS NEWS (Aug. 8,
2014, 8:19 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/judge-rules-against-ncaa-in-ed-obannon-case/.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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for future opportunities in the professional world of sports, “give their
blood, sweat, tears, and their lives for the success of their team and the
school’s reputation.” 223 College athletics is more than mere friendly
competition among schools—but a huge revenue and reputationgarnering business venture. 224
Although the NCAA continues to defend its preservation of
amateurism in college sports amidst past arguments that student-athletes
are employees of their institutions and are controlled by the coaching staff,
the IRS has thus far refused to characterize student-athletes as employees
from an income tax perspective. 225 However, in conjunction with growing
arguments that universities overtly control student-athletes, specifically
identifying student-athletes as employees of the institutions they play for
may require the IRS to eventually reevaluate its stance on taxing studentathletes’ scholarship income.
On April 19, 2014, the IRS drafted a public letter to the Honorable
Richard Burr, North Carolina U.S. Senator, confirming the current federal
tax treatment of college athletic scholarships.226 Within this letter, the IRS
noted that “whether an individual is treated as an employee for labor law
purposes is not controlling of whether the individual is an employee for
federal tax purposes.” 227 The letter further documented: “It has long been
the position of the IRS that athletic scholarships can qualify for exclusion
from income under section 117.” 228 Revenue Ruling 77-264, 1977 1 C.B.
47, addresses the tax treatment of athletic scholarships where the studentathlete is expected to participate in the sport and where the scholarship is
not cancelled in the event the student is not required to engage in any other
activities in lieu of participating in the sport. 229 The ruling holds that the
athletic scholarship awarded by the university is primarily to aid the

223. Roya R. Helmat, Malpractice During Practice: Should NCAA Coaches Be Liable For
Negligence?, 22 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 613, 635 (2002).
224. See Gurdus, supra note 208, at 929 (2001).
225. See Marc Edelman, The District Court Decision in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate
Athletic Association: A Small Step Forward for College-Athlete Rights, and a Gateway for Far
Grander Change, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2319, 2342 (2014) (discussing the NCAA’s current stance
on amateurism); see also NCAA Manual 2.9 (stating that “student-athletes shall be amateurs in an
intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated primarily by education and by the
physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is
an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and
commercial enterprises.”).
226. See Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, CONEX 113035-14, No. 20140016, (Apr. 19, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/14-0016.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Rev. Rul. 77-264, 1977 1 C.B. 47.
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recipients in pursuing their studies and, therefore, is excludable under
Section 117. 230
Regardless of this public assurance, future contractual agreements
between student-athletes and their universities that involve “additional
cash and a share of royalties could cause the IRS to conclude that an
athletic scholarship is part of a larger compensation package,” thereby
making the entire package taxable. 231 If certain student-athletes are
represented by a union, the result may ensue that qualified scholarships
become part of the overall negotiated term of the contractual
agreement. 232 Once a labor union is involved with negotiating the
qualified scholarships for student-athletes, it is more likely that the
scholarship money will become taxable income.
The O’Bannon decision referred to student-athletes’ share of revenue
from the use of their names and likenesses as compensation.233 The federal
reporting of such compensation would undoubtedly be considered taxable
income. 234 Similarly, student-athletes’ share of licensing revenue would
arguably be treated as taxable income by the IRS regardless of the fact
that such funds may be deposited into trusts. 235 Therefore, the current
NCAA notion that scholarship athletes are truly students first and athletes
second—rather than paid employees of their institutions—could be
heavily scrutinized in the future. 236
The landmark case in this area which signifies that athletic
scholarships could be taxable if student-athletes are treated as employees
falls to Bingler. 237 As discussed previously, the U.S. Supreme Court
impressed the significance of the quid pro quo test, preserving the notion
that students who provide services in exchange for scholarships or grants
may not exclude their awards from gross income. 238 Therefore, amounts
230. See Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, CONEX 113035-14, No. 20140016, supra note 226.
231. See Game On! Recent Legal Developments and Tax Issues for Collegiate Athletics, ROPES
& GRAY (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.ropesgray.com/news-and-insights/Insights/2014/
September/Game-On-Recent-Legal-Developments-and-Tax-Issues-for-Collegiate-Athletics.aspx.
232. Id.
233. Jackie Perlman & Alison Flores, Students, Athletes—and Taxpayers? A Recent Court
Decision may have Major Repercussions for Colleges’ Star Players, ACCOUNTING TODAY (Dec. 2,
2014),
http://www.accountingtoday.com/taxprotoday/news/students-athletes-226128-andtaxpayers72898-1.html.
234. Id.
235. Id. (further noting that although student-athletes may not have immediate access to trust
funds while they are in attendance at school, the athletes would likely be taxed when the compensation
is paid to the trust).
236. Id.
237. Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969).
238. See id. at 751 (The Court noted, “Here, the definitions supplied by the Regulation clearly
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received in return for services rendered are treated as compensation rather
than scholarship funds. 239
The Bingler decision exposes student-athletes to the possibility that
scholarship funds may inevitably be taxable given the totality of
contractual opportunities that could become part of student-athletes’
negotiable package deals in the future.240 Distinguishing scholarship
funds from stipends or compensation, which schools may begin to offer
select student-athletes, along with potential licensing revenues, could
create blurred lines when applying the Bingler quid pro quo test. 241
Ultimately, the decision of how to treat student-athletes’ scholarship funds
would likely come down to an IRS pronouncement or federal judicial
determination. For student-athletes, the tax code leaves no room for
interpretation—any form of compensation received in exchange for
playing sports will invalidate the tax-exempt nature of their scholarship
funds. 242
V. CONCLUSION
The NLRB’s 2014 ruling that Northwestern University’s scholarship
football players were employees of the institution under the NLRA and
could unionize and bargain collectively, though subsequently
unanimously overturned, temporarily threatened the NCAA’s deepseeded principle of amateurism in college sports.243 Under the strong
tradition of amateurism, student-athletes may only receive athletic
scholarships to help pay for their higher education, while simultaneously
engaging in competitive athletics for their respective universities. 244
Amateurism requires that student-athletes who are, or have been, paid to
are prima facie proper, comporting as they do with the ordinary understanding of ‘scholarships’ and
‘fellowships’ as relatively disinterested, ‘no strings’ educational grants, with no requirements of any
substantial quid pro quo from the recipients.”); see also Hoeflich, supra note 80, at 591 (noting the
significance of the Bingler court upholding the quid pro quo test).
239. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-6(d)(2), 53 Fed. Reg. 21688 (Jun. 9, 1988); see also Larkins,
supra note 96, at 70.
240. See Ken Berry, College Athletes Could Be Sacked with High Taxes on Scholarships, CPA
PRACTICE ADVISOR (Apr. 13, 2014), http://www.cpapracticeadvisor.com/news/11393197/collegeathletes-could-be-sacked-with-high- taxes-on-scholarships.
241. Id. (citing Dee DeScherer, a NJ-based tax publisher, who notes that while the Bingler
decision exposes student- athletes to the threat of tax liability, such exposure to federal taxation is not
a certainty).
242. See AndersenTax, Student-Athlete/Athlete-Employee: Tax Consequences, for Sure, FOR
THE RECORD (Sept. 2014), http://www.andersentax.com/publications/newsletter/september2014/student-athlete-athlete-employee-tax- consequences-for-sure.
243. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
244. Id.
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play are ineligible to compete in collegiate varsity athletic sports. 245
A secondary impact entails the potential tax consequences facing
student-athletes should they be deemed employees of their institutions
someday. 246 To date, student-athletes receiving qualified scholarships
have not been taxed on scholarship money received. 247 However, if
student-athletes are eventually characterized as employees of the
institutions they play for, it is viable that the IRS may reconsider whether
certain student-athletes are receiving part or all of their scholarship money
in exchange for services rendered.
The language of the IRC entails that a student may not exclude
amounts received from gross income if their institution requires services
in exchange for a grant or stipend. 248 Further, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Bingler noted the importance of applying the quid pro quo test, finding
that students who provide services in exchange for scholarships may not
exclude their awards from gross income. 249 Should the IRS eventually
reevaluate its stance on the taxability of student-athletes’ scholarship
funds, it would likely utilize its own twenty-factor common law test to
determine the proper characterization of student-athletes from a federal
income tax perspective. 250
The ultimate query hinges on whether the IRS will proactively elect
to reexamine the taxability of student-athletes’ scholarship money in the
future. Given that the IRS recently published a letter confirming the
federal tax treatment of athletic scholarships as it has been employed
historically, it could be argued that student-athletes’ scholarship money is
safe from the threat of federal taxation. 251 However, given the fact that
future contracts between student-athletes and their institutions may
involve additional cash or royalties and that student-athletes may now
earn a share of revenue from the use of their names and likenesses, the
IRS may be hard pressed to evaluate whether athletic scholarships are part
of a greater overall compensation package which is subject to taxation.252
Alternatively, it could be argued that at least a portion of the money paid
to certain student-athletes should be included in gross income.
Finally, the ultimate determination of the taxability of athletic
scholarships will likely hinge on the application of the Bingler quid pro
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
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quo test. 253 This U.S. Supreme Court decision exposes student-athletes to
the possibility that grants-in-aid may eventually be taxable based on the
overall contractual opportunities that may become part of their negotiable
package deals. 254 For scholarship or grant recipients, to include studentathletes, any form of compensation received in exchange for services
rendered will invalidate the tax-exempt nature of scholarship funds. 255
From a federal tax perspective the historical significance of the
NLRB’s 2014 Northwestern case as an archetype for student-athletes
seeking mobilized unionization, combined with decision in the O’Bannon
case, might one day redefine the notion that student-athletes are not mere
amateurs receiving qualified scholarships but instead are employees of
their institutions earning funds in exchange for services rendered on the
playing field. 256 Intrinsically, the IRS may have to reevaluate whether
qualified scholarships received by student-athletes are excludable from
gross income in the future. Defining student-athletes as employees of their
universities may likely cultivate a new era in taxing qualified
scholarships.

253.
254.
255.
256.
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